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"PUBLIC" RIGHTS AND PRIVATE FORUMS:
PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AND SECURITIES LITIGATION
Michael A. Lindsay*
INTRODUCTION
Private litigants today bring suit on a variety of rights arising under
express federal statutory provisions or implied by statutory language or
legislative history. The statutory right may be created by a public law
that regulates conduct and defines private rights. On the other hand, the
right may arise from a statutory scheme designed to effectuate a public
policy through the use of "private attorneys general." Frequently a liti-
gant may seek vindication of such a "public" right in the context of a
private relationship governed at least in part by contract. When this oc-
curs, a conflict may arise between statute and contract.
One type of conflict that may arise between statute and contract
involves the procedure by which a substantive statutory right may be
vindicated.' This, of course, depends on how much procedural guidance
the contract and the substantive statute provide. At one extreme the
statute might set forth a procedure for vindication of the right, including
provisions for venue and service of process; or it might specifically pro-
vide federal jurisdiction but say nothing more. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, a statute might say nothing at all about procedural matters
and instead rely on the general provision of federal question jurisdiction.2
Likewise, a contract might contain procedural enforcement mechanisms,
such as a forum- or venue-selection clause, or it might provide that its
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1. Another type of conflict, certainly more serious, may arise where a contract excludes a
substantive right or principle required by statute.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
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parties will forego litigation altogether and resolve their disputes pri-
vately through arbitration. The conflict between statutorily created pro-
cedures and contractually required arbitration, ff not the most frequently
encountered, has perhaps been the most controversial-and for good rea-
son. It raises a very serious question: where a statute creates a cause of
action and provides a remedy, may private parties contractually agree in
advance of a dispute to resolve "any controversy"-including controver-
sies based on the provisions of that statute-in a private forum?
As a general matter, agreements to arbitrate are strongly favored
and routinely enforced. The Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act)
provides that a written predispute arbitration agreement "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."3 But suppose the statute cre-
ating the right expressly provides a remedial procedure for its vindica-
tion. Can parties choose their own remedial procedures and ignore those
provided by statute? Or suppose that the statute is designed to effectuate
some public policy larger than the equities of the particular dispute. Can
private arbitration be trusted to have as balanced and broad a view of
public policy as the federal judiciary?4
In a variety of contexts, courts have found an implied exception to
the Arbitration Act for rights based on federal statutes, and in particular,
on statutes that the courts believe are designed to implement a significant
public policy. This Article is concerned primarily with the validity of
predispute agreements in one area of "public" rights-those asserted in
disputes between the securities industry and its public customers.5 The
complaining party in these disputes usually invokes one if not both of the
principal securities statutes 6-- the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),7 and
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) applies only to
contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce, id. §§ 1-2, but it applies to all such con-
tracts, contrary state law notwithstanding. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
4. State judiciaries are excluded here because current controversies involve statutes pro-
viding exclusive federal jurisdiction, and indeed exclusivity is frequently offered as a justifica-
tion for nonenforcement of arbitration agreements. See infra text accompanying notes 155-68.
The seminal Supreme Court decision in the area, however, involved concurrent jurisdiction
coupled with a prohibition of removal to federal court. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953).
5. "Public customer" is something of a term of art, referring to members of the general
public who are not associated with the securities industry except as customers.
Intra-industry disputes are excluded because they are subject to a specific statutory au-
thorization of predispute arbitration agreements. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982).
6. There are four securities statutes in addition to the principal statutes discussed in text
that also contain the nonwaiver provisions that will be discussed below. For example, the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb (1982)), provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)8 -and sometimes the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' The
courts are sharply divided on whether predispute agreements to arbitrate
controversies under these statutes should be enforced.
The thesis of this Article is that predispute agreements to arbitrate
securities disputes should be enforced in accordance with the Arbitration
Act. Whatever the merits of the general "statutory rights," "public
rights" or "public policy" exceptions to the mandate of the Arbitration
Act in other contexts, the securities laws present a fundamentally differ-
ent case. The 1933 and 1934 Acts' impact on predispute arbitration
agreements turns on the construction of particular statutory language
which prohibits waiver of statutory "provisions," and not on any "pol-
icy" exception. This language should be construed to permit arbitration.
RICO, on the other hand, contains no relevant and similarly specific pro-
vision. It must be analyzed in terms of the judicially created and policy-
based "public rights" exception to the Arbitration Act and not in terms
of statutory language. But though clothed in the garb of RICO, these
securities disputes should remain fully arbitrable.
On three occasions the United States Supreme Court has considered
the possibility that claims arising under the federal securities laws might
not be arbitrable pursuant to predispute agreements.10 In the first of
these three decisions, Wilko v. Swan,1 1 the Court held that a public cus-
tomer could not be compelled to arbitrate a claim arising under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act pursuant to a predispute agreement. In the other
two decisions, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 2 and Dean Witter Reynolds
waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77aaaa. The Investment Company Act of 1940, ch.
686, tit. 1, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982)), and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. 2, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982)), contain identical nonwaiver provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-46(a),
80b-15(a). The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, tit. 1, 49 Stat. 838
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982)), contains an identical nonwaiver provi-
sion, except that it substitutes "chapter" for "subchapter." 15 U.S.C. § 79z(a). The author
deals with these statutes only by implication; none of these nonwaiver provisions have been
subjected to judicial scrutiny.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
10. The Court has not yet considered the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate under
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. That question is now
pending in its docket. See infra note 14.
11. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
12. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
646 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:643
Inc. v. Byrd,13 the Court observed in dicta that claims arising under sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act might not receive the Wilko treatment. From
these three cases one can discern two basic models for understanding the
relationship between the securities laws and the Arbitration Act: the
Reed-Clark model that the Wilko Court adopted, and the White-Frank-
furter model reflected in Justice Frankfurter's Wilko dissent and Justice
White's Byrd concurrence.
The Reed-Clark model focuses on the special nature of the right
created by section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. It concerns the ways in which
the statutory right of action is distinct from the common-law action for
fraud, and on the various procedural advantages and benefits that the
1933 Act gives to securities plaintiffs. It essentially considers the proce-
dural benefits of the 1933 Act as goods in themselves. In contrast, the
White-Frankfurter model considers the procedural aspects significant
only insofar as they can be shown to affect the substantive right conferred
by the statute.
Wilko was wrongly decided because the Reed-Clark model that it
incorporated is based on two flawed assumptions: first, that predispute
arbitration agreements in the securities context are not voluntary in any
meaningful sense of the word; and second, that such agreements always
diminish the securities plaintiff's ability to obtain justice in disputes with
broker-dealers. In deciding the cases now pending before it,14 the Court
ought to reject the Reed-Clark model, embrace the White-Frankfurter
13. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
14. The Supreme Court granted the petition to review the Second Circuit's decision in
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
60 (1986), on both the 1934 Act and RICO questions. Other appellate decisions include Sterne
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1987) (section 10(b) claims not arbitra-
ble); Page v. Moseley, Haligarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986) (1934
Act claims arbitrable; RICO claims not arbitrable); Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d
1032 (11th Cir. 1986) (section 10(b) claims not arbitrable), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3536 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1987) (86-1218); Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986) (1934 Act claims not arbitrable; RICO claims arbitrable only if
"underlying" claim arbitrable), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1986)
(No. 86-487); Badart v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 775 (9th Cir.
1986) (claims under §§ 9(a)(4), 10(b), 15(b), 15(c), and 20(a) of 1934 Act not arbitrable), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1986) (86-591); King v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1987) (section 10(b) claims not arbitrable), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1986) (No. 86-282); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986) (1934 Act claims arbitrable),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578); Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986) (section 10(b) claims not arbitrable), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321). There appears to be
no correlation between a circuit's position on 1934 Act arbitrability and its position on RICO
arbitrability. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
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model, and effectively overrule Wilko. Even if the Court cannot bring
itself to overtly disavow the Reed-Clark model, however, the Court can
and should confine Wilko to its narrow holding by applying its rationale
strictly.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: A PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING
PRIVATE FORUMS
In 1925, Congress adopted the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration
Act).' 5 In enacting this law, Congress recognized the historic "jealousy
of the... courts for their own jurisdiction" and the consequent judicial
refusal "to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that
the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction."' 6 The Arbitra-
tion Act was designed specifically to overcome this tradition of hostility
and to declare arbitration agreements enforceable.' 7 In short, reversing
centuries of stare decisis, Congress established a public policy favoring
arbitration and the enforceability of arbitration agreements.'"
Section 2 of the Arbitration Act declares the validity, irrevocability,
and enforceability of any written "contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving [interstate or foreign] commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction... save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."' 9 Section 3 provides for the stay of judicial proceedings on "any
issue referable to arbitration" pending that arbitration;20 section 4 estab-
lishes a procedure for compelling a party to submit to arbitration.2'
Under these various presumptions and procedures, any party to a
contract can enjoy the benefit of the bargain. A defendant to an action
22
15. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982)).
16. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1924), quoted in Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346,
3353-54, 3354 n.14 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-13, 16 (1984); see also
Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommoda-
tion of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219, 221 (1986).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
20. Id. § 3.
21. Id. §4.
22. The statute speaks of "issue[s]" rather than "actions." This might be taken to suggest
that Congress understood that a single action could include both arbitrable and nonarbitrable
issues-possibly providing the linguistic basis for a "public policy" exception to the statute's
mandate. A more persuasive reading of this language, however, is that Congress knew that a
predispute agreement might not require arbitration of all "issues" or causes eventually pleaded
in a single "action." For example, an agreement might provide for arbitration of disputes
648 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:643
properly referable to arbitration under a previous agreement may obtain
a stay of judicial proceedings on that action "until such arbitration has
been had"-that is, until the plaintiff submits to the bargained arbitra-
tion; similarly, a plaintiff23 (or "claimant," in the language of arbitration)
may force a recalcitrant respondent to proceed to arbitration.24 Other
sections of the Arbitration Act provide certain procedural rules gov-
erning the arbitration hearing, as well as providing for judicial enforce-
ment of arbitration awards.25
II. WILKO v. SWAN: THE POLICY REPEALED?
Just eight years after passing the Arbitration Act, Congress adopted
the Securities Act of 193326 and created a regulatory scheme to govern
the behavior of securities offerors, dealers, and brokers. The 1933 Act
also provided new remedies for purchasers of securities. In section 12(2),
Congress created a remedy for material misstatements or half-truths in
connection with the sale or offer for sale of a security in interstate com-
arising "out of this agreement" instead of "out of the parties' relationship," thus requiring
arbitration of contract claims but not necessarily tort claims. See Comment, Arbitration of
Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. Rnv. 120, 125 (1977) ("The standard arbitration clause
is clearly designed to encompass almost any dispute which might arise between an investor and
his broker."). See generally Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
71 IowA L. REv. 1137 (1986).
23. One can envision circumstances where converse desires would exist. For example, a
defendant wishing for some reason to obtain a quick resolution of a dispute might seek an
order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act. Similarly a plaintiff, after filing
a complaint, might decide that he would prefer arbitration and seek to stay judicial proceed-
ings under § 3. This plaintiff, however, might run into waiver problems by virtue of his previ-
ous filing.
24. The discussion in the text correctly describes the parties' mutual right to enforce an
arbitration agreement pursuant to the Arbitration Act. Members of the American and New
York stock exchanges, however, are required by the exchanges' constitutions to submit their
disputes to arbitration at a customer's request even if there is no previous agreement to do so.
See Constitution of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 2 Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 1 9062 (1986); Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
art. XI, § 1, reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) % 1501 (1986). Enforcing predispute arbi-
tration agreements would correct this imbalance.
25. For a helpful summary of the procedures available in arbitration, see Katsoris, The
Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 279, 285-91 (1984). Professor
Katsoris is one of three "public" representatives to the Securities Industry Conference on Ar-
bitration (SICA). In addition to the four public members, SICA's membership also includes
ten self-regulatory securities organizations, as well as the Securities Industry Association. See
id. at 283 n.15; see also SEC Release No. 16,390 (Nov. 30, 1979), 18 SEC DOCKET 1197, 1197
& n.3 (1979). SICA was organized in 1977 to assist the industry and the SEC in developing
improved methods of dispute resolution. Katsoris, supra, at 283-84.
26. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1982)).
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merce17 In the same section that created the right, Congress provided
the remedy-a suit, "either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction .. ."I' The securities plaintiff was given the right to proceed
in either state or federal court and was exempted from the general provi-
sions permitting defendants to remove cases to federal court. Moreover,
the requirement of scienter was eliminated, and the burden of proving
(non-) negligence was shifted to the defendant.29 To ensure that the se-
curities industry did not deprive the customer of his statutory rights,
Congress also provided in section 14 that "[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations
of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission shall be void."30
In Wilko v. Swan, 31 the meaning of section 14's "nonwaiver" provi-
sion came into question. In 1951, plaintiff Wilko purchased 1600 shares
of common stock of Air Associates, Inc. for a price of nearly $30,000. In
his complaint, Wilko alleged that in selling the securities, defendants had
falsely represented to him that Air Associates and Borg Warner Corpo-
ration had agreed to a merger, which would greatly increase the value of
his stock. Wilko sold his stock two weeks after purchasing it at a loss of
nearly $4000, and he claimed this amount in damages.32 All in all, it was
a fairly typical securities dispute.
Pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement, the brokerage firm
moved for a stay under section 3 of the Arbitration Act.33 The predis-
pute agreement clearly extended to Wilko's claim;34 the relevant clause
provided that "[a]ny controversy arising between us under this contract
shall be determined by arbitration .... ,35 The district court held that
under section 14 of the 1933 Act, the arbitration agreement was unen-
forceable. 36 The Second Circuit reversed, holding the agreement enforce-
27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also infra note 76.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
31. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
32. Id. at 428-29.
33. Id. at 429.
34. But see supra note 22.
35. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432 n.15.
36. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439, rev'd 346
U.S. 427 (1953). The district court noted quite simply that the agreement provided for arbitra-
tion as "the sole method of deciding disputes," but that "Congress has granted the right to a
court remedy." Id. at 78. The court observed that the effect of arbitration clauses (which it
considered customary in the industry) was "to require the purchaser to sign away his rights to
a court remedy for violation of the Act which was passed to protect him, as a preliminary to
the purchase of stock." Id. That was perhaps enough to justify the district court's decision,
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able; the Supreme Court sided with the district court and reversed. 7
Wilko has sometimes been read as standing generally for the propo-
sition of a "public policy" exception to the Arbitration Act.38 It has also
been described (more accurately) as "rest[ing] on a foundation funda-
mentally different from the other public policy prohibitions on enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements. ' 39 This foundation is the assumption
that arbitration clauses are involuntarily agreed to by public customers
and that the securities industry is somehow taking advantage of its cus-
tomers. The Reed-Clark model embraces this assumption; the White-
Frankfurter model rejects it.
A. The Second Circuit and the Origins of the
White-Frankfurter Model
The White-Frankfurter model can be traced back to the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Wilko v. Swan,4° which the Supreme Court reversed.
The Second Circuit began with the central assumption that the plaintiff
but the court went on to examine the nature of arbitration. It argued that arbitration did not
provide a securities purchaser with protections "equivalent" to those that he would receive in
court, and it noted that arbitration was "informal" and provided "looser approximations to the
enforcement" of a plaintiff's rights. Id. (quoting American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consoli-
dated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944)). The district court also took into
account the "facts" that arbitrators were usually laymen and that they may not understand the
intricacies of the right provided by Congress. Id. (quoting American Almond Prods. Co. v.
Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) and CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, HANDBOOK AND GUIDE TO ARBITRATION UNDER THE NEW
YORK AND UNITED STATES ARBITRATION STATUTES 3-4 (1932)).
The court then marshalled two last arguments for its conclusion. First, it noted the diffi-
culty that a plaintiff might face if he had to divide his action, suing the non-signatory to the
arbitration agreement in court, and arbitrating his dispute with the broker-dealer. Id. at 79.
Second, the district court found that Congress "must have been aware of the lesser bargaining
position of the purchaser of securities." Id. The court therefore concluded that enforcement
of a predispute arbitration agreement "would accomplish in the same breath the contravention
of both the language and the policy of the Securities Act, for such an arbitration clause would
bar the purchaser from a remedy which the Act assures him." Id.
The first of these two arguments exposes a very real concern, for frequently a 1933 Act
securities plaintiff may wish to sue the issuer as well as the broker-dealer (for example, where
the issuer puts out an allegedly false press release which the broker-dealer republishes without
undertaking sufficient efforts to verify it). Nevertheless, this problem is not unique to the se-
curities context, and assuming that the agreement is in fact voluntary, it is exactly what the
parties bargained for. In fact, a variant of the argument arose again thirty years after Wilko in
the "intertwining" cases. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument in Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218-20 (1985).
37. 201 F.2d 439, rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
38. See, eg., Allison, supra note 18, at 233-34.
39. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy
Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 521 (1981).
40. 201 F.2d 439, rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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had voluntarily agreed to arbitration. Where the district court had noted
the seller's "superior bargaining power," the Second Circuit felt com-
pelled to "assume that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into the agree-
ment and fully understood its terms."41 Having before it what it
considered a voluntary agreement, the Second Circuit turned to the ques-
tion of whether that agreement was enforceable.
The appellate court first noted that the mere presence of a "statu-
tory cause of action" did not preclude arbitration,4 2 citing a variety of
other cases involving arbitration of statutory disputes.43 At least in this
context, the Second Circuit noted, there was no distinction between a
predispute agreement and an agreement made after an action had been
commenced.44
The court turned next to the district court's argument that a predis-
pute arbitration agreement constituted a waiver of the right to proceed in
court. The Second Circuit noted that a plaintiff could voluntarily settle a
claim without bringing a lawsuit. It therefore followed, by the Second
Circuit's reasoning, that a customer could agree to settle his dispute by
arbitration.45 The Second Circuit then suggested that a plaintiff might
want to do precisely this to take advantage of the "speedy remedy of
arbitration" in contrast to the long delayed remedy of a court trial.46
41. Id. at 442. This presumption of voluntariness stems in part from the plaintiff's proce-
dural default. The court noted that Wilko had failed to file an affidavit in response to defend-
ant's motion for a stay. Thus the court assumed that the agreement was voluntary and
therefore valid.
42. Compare this view with Justice Brennan's statement for the Court in McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984): "Because § 1983 creates a cause of action,
there is, of course, no question that Congress intended it to be judicially enforceable." This
decision is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 245-54. For another comment on this
issue, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353
(1985) ("we find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its
ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims").
43. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 443.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 444. This argument completely misses the point. Section 14 of the 1933 Act
clearly provides that a public customer cannot be required to waive compliance with the Act as
a condition for the purchase of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). The Second Circuit's
suggestion that a plaintiff can be required to execute a settlement agreement as a condition of
doing business is tantamount to holding that he can be required to waive his rights to compli-
ance with the Act's substantive provisions, a waiver that clearly violates both the letter and the
spirit of § 14's prohibitions. See infra note 128. Note, too, the Court's assumption that the
agreement was "voluntary." See supra text accompanying note 41. As will be seen, the ques-
tion of voluntariness ought to play no role in construing the nonwaiver provision, see infra text
at notes 121-52; the Second Circuit's assumption was more appropriate than the district
court's contrary assumption, see supra note 25, because the former lessened the significance of
voluntariness vel non and permitted the court to focus on the real issue.
46. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 444. One begins to wonder whether federal courts have always
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This would be particularly true in New York City, "where calendar con-
gestion both in the state courts and the federal court is notorious and
results in excessive delay." 47
Finally, the Second Circuit addressed the burden of proof of negli-
gence which, under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, is shifted to the de-
fendant. The court determined that although this rule was unusual and
arbitrators did not usually "consider themselves bound to decide strictly
according to legal rules," they were required to do so if the arbitration
agreement so provided.4" The agreement at issue in Wilko provided that
the parties' fights were "subject to" the 1933 Act.4 9 The Second Circuit
concluded that this required the arbitrators to obey the provisions of sec-
tion 12(2),1° and the court noted that the arbitrators' failure to comply
with this rule would be grounds for vacating the award under section 10
of the Arbitration Act." The court did not, however, say how it could
ever determine whether the arbitrators had failed to abide by section
12(2).52
B. Judge Clark and the Origins of the Reed-Clark Model
Judge Charles Clark dissented from the Second Circuit's decision in
Wilko v. Swan,53 and offered several reasons for affirming the "wise and
beneficent" decision of the district court. 4 First, he noted the general
principle that arbitration should not be used "as a device to blunt or
break social legislation."5 Although Judge Clark did not so state, this
argument is the counterpoint to the majority's view that the statutory
nature of a fight is not in itself sufficient to preclude arbitration. In
Judge Clark's view, certain statutory rights embody public principles so
labored under this heavy burden of congested dockets. See generally R. POSNER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
47. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 444.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 445. The Supreme Court did not consider this quite as obvious as the Second
Circuit did. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 433 n.18 (1953). Nevertheless the Court did
ultimately accept the proposition, as did the dissent. See id.; see also id. at 439-40 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
50. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 444-45.
51. Id. at 445.
52. But Justice Frankfurter did. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
53. 201 F.2d 439, rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
54. Id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark was a principal draftsman of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and perhaps this involvement helps explain his preference for judicial
resolution of securities disputes. For an interesting discussion of his and other drafters' beliefs
and motivations in the Rules project, see Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 498-515 (1986).
55. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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important that their enforcement cannot be the subject of a predispute
arbitration agreement.
Focusing more specifically on the 1933 Act, the dissent next noted
that arbitration would not satisfy the specific policy of that Act, the "ob-
jective and sympathetic consideration of [the customer's] claim ....
Judge Clark did not offer any specific provision in the statute as the
source for this pro-plaintiff policy; presumably, and no doubt fairly, he
thought this goal implicit in the statute's structure and language. More
troubling than the specific source of this policy, however, is Judge
Clark's conclusion that arbitration would not provide the customer an
"objective and sympathetic" hearing. 7
Judge Clark then responded to the majority's treatment of the bur-
den of proof issue. He noted first of all that it would be unrealistic to
expect that arbitrators would or could "manipulate" this rule in the same
way that judges and lawyers could." In any event, he continued, this
would be contrary to the purpose of arbitration, namely to avoid the
"legal restrictions" and "fancy legalisms" of the courtroom. 9 He then
noted that the summary nature of arbitration proceedings, records, and
decisions would preclude judicial review of arbitrators' behavior on this
point, and that this amounted to "a clear loss of statutory right ... "'I
Next, Judge Clark responded to the majority's discussion of the
"speedy trial" and "congested calendar" issues. Here the dissent pointed
to the concurrent jurisdiction and expansive venue rights granted by the
statute. This jurisdictional right, the dissent argued, was the statutorily
provided means by which a dissatisfied customer could avoid delay. If
the customer thought the federal and state courts in New York were too
congested, an action could be brought in another court or venue, where
congestion was less of a problem.61 Finally, the dissent turned to the
role of section 14 of the 1933 Act. Section 14, Judge Clark observed, was
a general prohibition on required waivers of rights. Judge Clark opined
that more specific prohibition of predispute arbitration agreements was
unnecessary in light of this section, and indeed would have been highly
unusual. 2
56. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
57. This point recurred in the Supreme Court's opinion. See infra text accompanying
notes 69-70.
58. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent assumed without saying in
so many words that arbitrators were not lawyers.
59. Id. at 445-46 (Clark, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). But compare the Commodities Exchange Act, which specif-
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Perhaps Judge Clark's strongest argument was the analogy to re-
leases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 3 The case
law construing FELA held that pre-accident releases are unenforceable,
while post-accident releases are generally enforceable if fairly and reason-
ably made as part of a settlement.' The dissent offered this analogy as
appropriate guidance for distinguishing predispute and postdispute
agreements." Had Judge Clark been willing to tease out this argument a
bit more, he might have noted that section 14 forbade the waiver of judi-
cial remedies as a condition of sale, but not in the context of a postdis-
pute settlement.
C. The Supreme Court and the Reed-Clark Model
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Wilko
v. Swan.66 In explaining the Court's decision, Justice Reed's majority
opinion focused on section 14 of the 1933 Act and the critical question of
whether the conferring of judicial jurisdiction over section 12(2) claims
was a "provision" whose waiver the securities vendor could not require
as a condition of doing business.67 The reasons for the Court's decision
ically provides that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission shall devise a scheme to
insure that arbitration agreements are voluntary. This statute is discussed infra in text accom-
panying notes 137-44.
Although the dissent said nothing of why this general prohibition should overrule the
Arbitration Act's mandate, one might argue that the 1933 Act came later in time and therefore
trumped the Arbitration Act. This, however, would ignore the general canon of statutory
construction that repeal by implication is disfavored, see, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,
455 U.S. 72, 88 (1982), although admittedly this canon has itself come into disfavor. See
generally R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 281-82. One might also argue that the 1933 Act was
the more "specific" legislation in that it purported to govern a specific transaction while the
Arbitration Act governed "commercial transactions" more generally. Against this, however,
could be placed the argument that the 1933 Act made a general grant of jurisdiction, while the
Arbitration Act made a more specific provision for the types of agreements that might govern
the courts' exercise of that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51
(1974). (This is not to say that the Arbitration Act divests courts ofjurisdiction. See infra Part
IV of this Article.)
63. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
64. Wilko, 201 F.2d at 446 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332
U.S. 625 (1948)).
65. The dissent, however, declined to address the question whether postdispute arbitration
agreements are enforceable. Compare Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Supreme Court's
opinion, which argues in favor of the enforceability of postdispute arbitration agreements.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
66. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
67. This view was perpetuated by the SEC at least as late as 1979. See Notice to Broker-
Dealer Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements Which Provide for Arbitration of Future
Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,122, at 81,975 (July 2, 1979) ("a predispute arbitration agreement constitutes a waiver of
the right to a judicial forum") [hereinafter Exchange Act Release].
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are not entirely clear. The Court stated that it reached its conclusion
"for the reasons set out above in the statement of petitioner's conten-
tion,"6 8 but it continued to supply somewhat different reasons.
The major premise of the petitioner's argument had been that Con-
gress' purpose in enacting the 1933 Act was to prevent sellers from doing
anything that might "weaken their ability to recover under the Securities
Act."6 9 The minor premise of the argument was that arbitration "lacks
the certainty of a suit at law under the Act ..... ,7 The conclusion was
that section 14 (from which petitioner had divined his major premise)
forbade a seller from requiring a buyer to agree to arbitration as a condi-
tion of doing business.
This syllogism is fundamentally flawed, for the conclusion does not
follow from the premises. What the argument lacks is an additional mi-
nor premise-that arbitration results in a net disadvantage to securities
customers or securities plaintiffs. Although it is far from clear that this
additional minor premise would accurately reflect the true state of affairs
either in 195371 or today,72 it is apparently an assumption in which the
68. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
69. Id. at 432.
70. Id.
71. The author has not found statistics for 1953, when the Supreme Court decided Wilko,
or for 1952, when the action was commenced. The closest figures available are for the years
1957-61. During that period, claimants (i.e., securities plaintiffs) prevailed in 43.4% of the
submissions that proceeded to award through the New York Stock Exchange arbitration pro-
cedures. See S.E.C., REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doe. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 12, at 559 (1963). The underlying statistics are reprinted in
Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 22, at 130 n.63.
72. For the period 1980-85, 52% of the public-customer cases were decided in the public
customer's favor. See FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION, STATISTICAL REPORT, (Apr. 1986) (Exhibit A). For 1985 alone, the figure is 55%.
Neither figure reflects arbitrations conducted before the American Arbitration Association.
Since 1950, the New York Stock Exchange arbitrations apparently have become more pro-
plaintiff. For the six-year period of 1980-85, 50.9% of its decided cases resulted in public-
customer awards; for 1985 alone, the figure is 52.1%. Id. The figures provided here and in
supra note 71, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. To begin with, it is unclear what
percentage of claims are in some sense truly "just," that is, "ought" to be vindicated in some
sense other than the purely probabilistic; perhaps it is more than 50%, perhaps it is less.
Moreover, one might argue that these figures are consistent with a hypothesis of arbitral hostil-
ity to claimants. If the figures represent substantially more submissions under predispute
agreements than under postdispute agreements, it may be that plaintiffs' lawyers, armed with a
mature claim and the comparatively greater resources that a party will devote to obtaining
information about the claim's vindication, are able to perceive arbitral hostility. The percent-
age of claimant victories nevertheless would have to remain high in order to persuade those
already bound to arbitrate to go forward. If there were no substantial likelihood of success, the
claimant would not expend the resources to prosecute a claim, although these resources would
be less than required for litigation. Of course, it may be that the plaintiff's lawyer avoids
arbitration for reasons independent of the merits of the claim. For example, he may lack
656 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:643
Court was willing to indulge.
7 3
Justice Reed put a bit more flesh on the bare bones of Wilko's argu-
ment. He noted that securities sellers have more information about the
potential returns on a security than buyers have, and that one might
therefore reasonably assume that Congress wished 4to place securities
buyers in a different position from that of other kinds of purchasers. Jus-
tice Reed then commented on the particular significance of the 1933
Act's procedural provisions. He remarked that a buyer "has a wider
choice of courts and venue than other types of purchasers." He also
noted that the summary nature of arbitration proceedings74 precluded
judicial examination of arbitrators' conception and application of such
statutory requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable care," or "ma-
terial fact."75 Earlier in his opinion, Justice Reed had noted that section
12(2) "created a special right to recover for misrepresentation which dif-
fers substantially from the common-law action in that the seller is made
to assume the burden of proving lack of scienter."76 Justice Reed offered
an analogy different from that which Judge Clark had offered in the
court below. He observed that a predispute venue-restriction agreement
had been held invalid under FELA. In so holding, the Court had said
that "the right to select the 'forum' even after the creation of a liability is
a 'substantial right' .... ,,7 It is not clear whether Justice Reed intended
to use "substantial right" to mean a substantive right, or merely a very
significant procedural right.
familiarity with arbitration procedures or desire to impose discovery costs on the opposing
party in the hopes of improving his own settlement posture. On the whole, the figures simply
seem too favorable to claimants to support an "arbitral hostility" thesis.
73. The assumption is not intuitively obvious. Arbitrators are not mere stooges of the
securities industry, and plaintiffs' lawyers will make sure that arbitrators are adequately ap-
prised of the standards of section 12(2). If arbitrators indeed act in good faith, their uncer-
tainty as to the application of the statute may cause them to give the customer an even greater
benefit of the doubt than he is legally entitled to. For a more favorable view of the advantages
of arbitration for securities customers, see generally Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes
Through The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. RaV. 393 (1987).
74. Records of arbitration proceedings are not usually kept. See, e.g., UNIF. CODE OF
ARBITRATION § 37, NASD Manual (CCH) 3737, at 3720 (July 1, 1986).
75. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
76. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Actually, Justice Reed mischaracterized this burden.
The defendant is required not only to prove a lack of scienter but also to prove his own lack of
negligence. See supra text at note 29. (It thus becomes more of a "burden of disproof" than
merely a shifted burden of proof.) Both the majority opinion and Judge Clark's dissent in the
Second Circuit had correctly characterized this burden. See supra text at notes 48-51 and 58-
60.
77. Id. at 438 (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949)).
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D. Justice Frankfurter and the White-Frankfurter Model
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the Court's decision in Wilko v.
Swan.7 8 His opinion begins with the unstated assumption that the proce-
dural provisions of the 1933 Act are not themselves "provisions" within
the meaning of section 14. Only the substantive right, together with its
special procedural requirement, is a "provision" within the meaning of
that section. A predispute arbitration agreement would be prohibited by
section 14 only if either of two conditions obtained: (1) If arbitration
"inherently precluded full protection" of a customer's rights under sec-
tion 12(2); or (2) if there were "no effective means of ensuring judicial
review of the legal basis of the arbitration ....
With regard to his first condition, Justice Frankfurter observed that
neither the record nor judicial notice provided any reason to believe that
"the arbitral system as practiced in the City of New York, and as en-
forceable under the supervisory authority of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, would not afford the plaintiff the rights
to which he is entitled." 0 In a footnote, he noted some of the procedures
governing arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association."1
Justice Frankfurter's second condition is somewhat more problem-
atic. He agreed with the Second Circuit that arbitrators were obliged to
follow the rules set forth in section 12(2) as to burden of proof and other
issues. Apparently, Justice Frankfurter thought that at least where the
standards of section 12(2) differed from those of the common law, "ap-
propriate means for judicial scrutiny must be implied, in the form of
some record or opinion, however informal . ..."" Arbitration awards
customarily do no more than state the result and the amount of the
award, if any. Exactly how much more Justice Frankfurter expected of
the "record or opinion" in arbitrations of section 12(2) claims is not
clear. Nor is it entirely clear why an arbitration award should provide
any greater detail (for purposes of judicial scrutiny) than a general jury
verdict would offer.8 3 Still, Justice Frankfurter's suggestion is consistent
with recent calls for modification of arbitration procedures in order to
78. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
79. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Minton joined the dissent.
80. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 439 n.* (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This was one of the forums that the cus-
tomer was permitted to choose under his contract. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 442, rev'd,
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
82. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. Of course, the court reviewing a jury verdict can at least determine whether the jury
was properly instructed on the legal issues. In arbitration, a claimant may set out the proper
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accommodate "public policy" concerns.84
Finally, Justice Frankfurter noted that the voluntariness vel non of
the arbitration agreement was immaterial to construction of section 14.
A predispute arbitration agreement theoretically might be void because
of overreaching, but that issue was not present in the case at bar. How-
ever, in Justice Frankfurter's view, the existence of this separate defense
did not bear on the relationship between the 1933 Act and the Arbitra-
tion Act.
III. THE 1934 AcT AND THE WILKO FRAMEWORK
Section 29 of the 1934 Act contains a non-waiver provision that the
Supreme Court has found substantially similar to that provided by sec-
tion 14 of the 1933 Act.8 6 The 1934 Act therefore presents a question
very similar to that which the 1933 Act posed in Wilko v. Swan, 7 but
precisely what that question is, is not clear. Is the "provision" at issue
the procedural protections bestowed by the statute or the substantive
right to bring a claim based on a violation of the statute? This section of
the Article again considers precisely what question Wilko answered.
A. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements under the 1934 Act in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 8
There the Court held that a predispute arbitration agreement was en-
forceable in the context of an international dispute arguably governed by
the 1934 Act. The key factor in the Court's decision was the interna-
tional nature of the dispute.8 9 The Court accepted arguendo the general
premise that the 1934 Act precludes enforcement of predispute arbitra-
standards in his arguments and in whatever papers the arbitrators will accept, but the respon-
dent might put forth a less restrictive test.
84. See, eg., Allison, supra note 18, at 269-75. Professor Allison makes the excellent point
that one hardly need bother to look for specific statutory authorization of enhanced judicial
intervention in the arbitral process:
By interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act as not permitting arbitration of antitrust
claims under future-dispute clauses, the federal courts have clearly exhibited suffi-
cient judicial power to accommodate the policies of the Act with other public policies
in virtually any way they see fit. If the courts have the power to completely deny
arbitrable status to antitrust claims, they certainly have the power to do less by per-
mitting arbitration with a degree of [judicial] supervision.
Id. at 273-74 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. For a discussion of voluntariness, see infra text accompanying notes 121-52.
86. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 n.7 (1974).
87. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
88. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
89. Id. at 515-21. As to the arguability of this proposition, see id. at 514 n.8, 516 n.9.
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tion agreements. 90 Before accepting the premise, however, the Court set
forth two reasons why the 1934 Act might be construed differently from
the 1933 Act. First, it noted that the 1934 Act contains no statutory
counterpart to section 12(2) of the 1933 Act; and although the Court
conceded that lower courts had inferred the existence of a private remedy
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "the Act itself does not establish the
'special right' that the Court in Wilko found significant." 91 Second, the
Court noted that the 1934 Act provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction
of claims arising thereunder, in contrast to the 1933 Act's provision of
concurrent jurisdiction coupled with a ban on removal to federal court.
The Court described this difference as "significantly restricting the plain-
tiff's choice of forum." 92
The Scherk Court, commenting on the differences between the pro-
cedural provisions of the two Acts, described these provisions as the sub-
ject of the Wilko Court's holding in Wilko v. Swan9 3 : "[C]ertain of the
'provisions' of the 1933 Act that the Court held could not be waived by
Wilko's agreement to arbitrate, find no counterpart in the 1934 Act."
'94
Although this does seem to be a correct description of at least one of
Wilko's two rationales, it ignores the focus of Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent, which viewed the statutory specification of procedural benefits as
incidental to the substantive "provision."
B. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd
The Supreme Court next discussed Wilko's boundaries in Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.95 Like the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co.,96 the Byrd Court described the holding of the Court in Wilko v.
Swan9 7 in terms of "a stipulation waiving the right to seek a judicial
remedy ... ."9 It repeated the Scherk Court's dissection of Wilko, but
noted that lower courts have nevertheless applied Wilko's analysis to
claims arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.9 9 But since the de-
fendant had failed to move for a stay pending arbitration of the 1934 Act
90. Id. at 515.
91. Id. at 513-14.
92. Id. at 514.
93. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
94. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
95. 470 U.S. 213, 215 n.1 (1985).
96. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
97. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
98. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215 n.1.
99. Id.
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claim, the Supreme Court in Byrd declined to reach the issue.'°0
Justice White, however, in a separate concurrence emphasized the
relevant differences between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.10 1
Although he noted the difference in the breadth of jurisdiction provided
by the two Acts, he devoted more attention to the nature of the substan-
tive right. First, he noted that the section 10(b) right of action "is im-
plied rather than express." 10 2 He then observed that the statutory
language-"waive compliance with any provision of this chapter" '03  is
thus "literally inapplicable."' 1  Second, citing the "special right" lan-
guage of Justice Reed's majority opinion in Wilko, Justice White noted
that Wilko's "solicitude for the federal cause of action... is not necessar-
ily appropriate where the cause of action is judicially implied and not so
different from the common-law action."' 105
1. Implied rights
The linguistic analysis that Justice White offered as his first point
raises a thorny problem. The Wilko holding pertains to the judicial rem-
edy for the substantive right, not to the substantive right itself. Justice
White's suggestion that the implied right under section 10(b) is not a
"provision" of the 1934 Act thus seems misplaced, at least under the
Wilko majority's decision. Under the Wilko analysis, the "provision" at
issue in the 1934 Act is the procedural right to bring the claim in federal
court,' 6 rather than the substantive antifraud right itself, judicially cre-
ated under section 10(b). Arbitration agreements require waiver of this
procedural right, but they do not even purport to require waiver of the
substantive section 10(b) right.
But if Justice White is correct that the right implied under section
10(b) is not a "provision" of the 1934 Act, then at least theoretically, a
broker-dealer could require his customer to "waive compliance" with the
100. Id. at 216 n.I.
101. Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
103. Id. (White, 3., concurring) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1981)) (emphasis added by
Justice White).
104. Id. (White, J., concurring).
105. Id. (White, J., concurring). Despite his remarks in Byrd, Justice White's current posi-
tion is not clear. Compare Justice Whites concurrence in Byrd with his joinder in Justice
Douglas' dissent in Scherk. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 534 ("Section 29 of the 1934 Act... renders
arbitration clauses void and inoperative. .. ").
106. This "right" is also an obligation. If a customer chooses to assert the section 10(b)
private right of action in a judicial forum, he can do so only in federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1982). See also infra notes 113-15 and 155-68 and accompanying text.
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statute's substantive command.1"7 So perhaps what Justice White meant
in his Byrd concurrence is simply that the greater power includes the
lesser. If the broker-dealer can require his customer to waive the sub-
stantive right altogether, then the lesser exercise of that power-requir-
ing the customer to vindicate the right through arbitration rather than
judicial action-must also escape the ban of section 29(a).
108
107. This "extreme" result, however, would not be disastrous for securities customers.
Even if required to waive his § 10(b) rights, a plaintiff would still have his state statutory
rights. A broker-dealer who required waiver of § 10(b) rights might presumably also require
waiver of state common-law rights, since blue-sky laws customarily forbid waivers only of
rights granted by the statute or rules and orders promulgated pursuant to the statute. See, e.g.,
UNIF. SECURITIES AcT of 1956 § 410(g), 7B U.L.A. 644 (1985); UNIF. SECURITIES Acr of
1985 § 802(b), 7B U.L.A. 93 (Cum. Supp. 1987). As Justice White notes (in his second point),
the federal cause of action is "not so different from the common-law action" supplied by state
law. Moreover, at least some of the interests protected by § 10(b) are also guarded by various
state blue-sky laws. See, e.g., UNIF. SECURrrIs AcT of 1956 § 101, 7B U.L.A. 516 (1985); see
also id. § 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643, which is comparable to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Liability
under the 1985 Uniform Act is limited to the causes of action expressly provided in sections
601-609. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT of 1985 § 609(b), 7B U.L.A. 83 (Cum. Supp. 1987). These
sections create liability for violations of section 501(2) (untrue statements and omissions of
material facts), but not section 501(1) ("device, scheme or artifice to defraud"), and so not all
of the 1985 language that parallels section 101 of the 1956 Act will give rise to a private right
of action. The nonwaiver provisions of both Uniform Acts, supra, would preclude a required
waiver of these substantive statutory rights. Thus, a securities customer would still have his
state law statutory remedies if a broker-dealer required him to waive compliance with section
10(b) and state common law.
The 1985 Uniform Act (which as of February, 1987, had been adopted only by the states
of Maine and New Mexico, see 7B U.L.A. 30 (Cum. Supp. 1986)), specifically addresses the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, but its resolution of the question is not clear. Under
the 1985 Uniform Act, "[a] provision in a contract containing (i) an agreement to arbitrate or
(ii) a choice of law provision in a contract between persons engaged in the securities business is
not a provision waiving compliance with this [Act] and is enforceable in accordance with its
terms." UNIF. SECURITIES ACT of 1985 § 802(b), 7B U.L.A. 93 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The
compound prepositional phrase beginning with "in a contract" appears to modify only sub-
clause (ii), meaning that all arbitration agreements are enforceable. But if the phrase modifies
subclause (i) as well, then the Act itself does not render such agreements enforceable. The
question is somewhat academic in light of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and
in light of the official comment to this section. See UNIF. SECURITIES ACT of 1985 § 802(b),
comment (2), 7B U.L.A. (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("In general, contractual provisions waiving com-
pliance with this Act are unenforceable. The two exceptions are agreements to arbitrate, as to
which the Federal Arbitration Act overrides contrary state law, and agreements solely among
persons engaged in the securities business specifying a particular choice of law.") Neverthe-
less, legislatures considering adopting the 1985 Uniform Act should consider forestalling litiga-
tion by a simple clarification: reverse the order of the phrase by placing all of subclause (i)
after the words "securities business."
108. Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act provides that: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 29(a), 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a) (1982)).
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One difficulty, however, with Justice White's analysis is this: if the
section 10(b) implied right of action is not a "provision" within the
meaning of section 29(a), then why do federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction of such claims pursuant to section 27?1o9 Perhaps the answer lies
in a continuation of Justice White's linguistic analysis. Section 27 no-
where speaks of "provisions"; instead it speaks of "suits... brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regu-
lations thereunder."' 0 Can the rights implied by section 10(b) and its
subsidiary regulations be based on "liabilit[ies] or dut[ies] created" by the
1934 Act without also being "provisions" of the same statute? That is,
can an action be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts,
without also being based on a "provision" within the meaning of section
29?
Under Justice White's analysis, the answer is clearly "yes": federal
courts can have exclusive jurisdiction over "nonprovisions" whose pro-
tection a broker-dealer can require his customer to waive. But this an-
swer is limited to implied rights; express rights of action are undoubtedly
provisions whose required waiver is prohibited. As Justice Frankfurter
noted, "[i]f arbitration inherently precluded full protection of the rights
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act affords to a purchaser of securities.., an
agreement to settle the controversy by arbitration would be barred by
§ 14, the antiwaiver provision .... ,
Perhaps an even more basic objection may be lodged against Justice
White's analysis. Under the modem theory of private rights of action, a
private action exists only if the legislature expressly provides it or implic-
itly intends it."I2 Courts are instructed to infer an implied private right of
action only if there is evidence of legislative intent to provide it.,13 But if
an implied private right exists only if intended by the legislature, is it not
also a "provision" of the statute? Judge Tjoflat, concurring in the Elev-
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) ("The district courts of the United States... shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction ... of all suits ... brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."). True, the Supreme Court has not yet de-
cided whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under section
10(b), but it does not appear to be a matter that is, in Justice White's words, in "substantial
doubt." See, e.g., Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 1986).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
111. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
112. See Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in
the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 548-69 (1986).
113. The point here is not that courts actually follow this admonition, or indeed, that this
approach is intellectually defensible. But it is in any event the reigning theory of the age. See,
e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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enth Circuit's decision in Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 114 found this hur-
dle insurmountable for those who would distinguish the right implied in
section 10(b) from the express right contained in section 12(2).115 It does
not necessarily follow, however, that in implicitly creating a "liability or
duty" for purposes of section 27 Congress also intended to create a sec-
tion 29 "provision" as well. As used in section 29, "provision" should be
given a narrow construction by the courts and apply only to express
rights of action, at least where the implied right is little different from the
common law. Otherwise, the presumption against implied repealers is
twice violated-once in construing the nonwaiver provision to repeal the
Arbitration Act pro tanto, and again to extend that repealer to implied
rights of action.
Thus, the analysis again returns to the question so neatly side-
stepped by the greater/lesser power reasoning. Even if a literal reading
of section 29 would permit a broker-dealer to require his customer to
waive the substantive rights of section 10(b) altogether, does a literal
reading also permit him to dictate the procedures by which an unwaived
substantive right may be vindicated? Initially the answer might seem to
be negative. If the "provision" at issue is the judicial remedy, then the
provision here is express. Section 27 grants the right to a judicial remedy
for any right "created by this chapter." That is, there is an express "pro-
vision" for jurisdiction of any right impliedly "created" by the statute.116
This analysis, however, rests on an assumption that the procedural rule is
itself a "provision" within the meaning of section 29. This is certainly
not the White-Frankfurter model, in which the substantive right is the
114. 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986).
115. Id. at 1039 (Tjoflat, 3., concurring). Judge Tjoflat reasoned that:
To say that a private cause of action is implied is to say that Congress intended such
an action to exist.... It is as if Congress explicitly provided for the cause of action.
Because Congress intended to create a section 10(b) cause of action, it also intended
section 29 to be applicable to it, and the inquiry before us is no different than the one
before the Court in Wilko.
Id. Judge Tjofiat's first statement is undeniable within the rhetoric of modem theory. His
second sentence, however, is much too universal. It assumes that an implied right of action
must be treated for all purposes in the same way as an express cause of action. Indeed, this is
the conclusion that Judge Tjoflat's third sentence declares. Yet there is no particular reason
why this assumption necessarily must hold true. One could more easily argue that in inferring
a congressional intention that is not expressly stated in the statute itself, the courts ought to
confine the judicial gloss as narrowly as possible, for there are really two questions involved in
inferring a private right of action. First, did Congress intend the courts to recognize a private
right, and second, what did Congress intend to be the relationship between the private right
and the express provisions of the statute. Judge Tjoflat's approach collapses the two questions
into one and assumes that in all cases Congress intended the implied right to be treated in the
same way as an express right.
116. This again accords with Judge Tjoflat's analysis. See id.
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"provision." Neither does it accurately represent the Wilko majority's
approach, under which the procedural rule is the "provision" but only in
the context of a "special right."
2. "Special" rights
Justice White's second consideration as to the substantive right in-
volved does not depend on such rarefied linguistic analysis. In Wilko, the
Court had characterized section 12(2) as creating a "special right" dis-
tinct from common-law rights because the "seller is made to assume the
burden of proving lack of scienter."117 Moreover, the Wilko Court of-
fered this as one example of a benefit to securities buyers that the Court
could never insure was afforded them in arbitration because an arbitra-
tion award "may be made without explanation of [the arbitrators'] rea-
sons and without a complete record of [the] proceedings . ,,1.8 As
Justice White noted, the section 10(b) action is little different from the
state common law action (and for that matter, from state law statutory
actions) which the Byrd Court found were subject to arbitration by the
Arbitration Act.119 If there are no particular distinctions between the
federal action and the common-law action, then there is no reason to
accord to the federal action the special protection that the Court has
already found waivable as to the state action. 120
IV. VOLUNTARINESS AND WILKO'S FLAWED ASSUMPTION
In Wilko v. Swan,' 2' both the Supreme Court and the two lower
courts commented on whether the predispute agreement could be called
"voluntary" in any meaningful sense. Indeed, Wilko has been character-
ized as premised "on [the] recognition that arbitration clauses in securi-
ties sales agreements generally are not freely negotiated"' 22 and as
avoiding "the disadvantages of a case-by-case approach to deciding
whether an arbitration clause was a product of any inequality of bargain-
ing power . 123
But whether an agreement is voluntary is entirely irrelevant to the
question of whether the nonwaiver provision forbids its enforcement.
Either an agreement constitutes a "stipulation... binding any person...
117. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 436.
119. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223-24.
120. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
121. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
122. Sterk, supra note 39, at 519.
123. Id.
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to waive compliance with [a] provision"' 2 4 of the statute, or it does not.
If it is such a stipulation, the statute provides that it shall be void; if it is
not such a stipulation, the antiwaiver section does not bar its enforce-
ment.'2 5 It does not matter whether the customer voluntarily agreed to
the stipulation or not.'2 6 For example, if a customer willingly and with
his eyes wide open persuaded a broker-dealer to reduce his commission
fifty percent in exchange for the customer's waiver of the substantive pro-
tections of the 1933 Act,127 the stipulation would nevertheless be void.
128
The White-Frankfurter model recognizes the irrelevance of an arbi-
tration agreement's voluntariness vel non. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter
made this point in his Wilko dissent. 129 The Court in Scherk v. Alberto-
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (1982).
125. This does not necessarily mean that the clause is enforceable. The Arbitration Act
provides that an arbitration agreement shall be unenforceable for any reason that is generally
applicable to contracts. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). A contract of adhesion is subject to close judicial
scrutiny. See Fletcher, supra note 73, at 446.
126. Against this it might be said that the statutory use of the word "waive" incorporates a
requirement of voluntariness, because the usual definition of "waiver" is the "intentional or
voluntary relinquishment of a known right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979).
The key word in the nonwaiver provisions, however, is "stipulation." The usual meaning of
waiver does not fit in this context. It simply makes no linguistic sense to say that the provision
applies to stipulations that "bind" or require a consumer to "voluntarily relinquish a known
right." If the customer is "bound," then he doesn't "voluntarily" do that which he is "bound"
to do. "Waiver" here simply means to relinquish or forego.
127. This analogy-with the customer getting the discount in exchange for the agreement
to waive his substantive rights-is helpful only because all reported cases seem to deal with
securities plaintiffs unhappy with their predispute arbitration agreements. Ex ante, however, a
public customer who wished to establish a long-term relationship with a broker might prefer a
predispute arbitration agreement and be willing to pay a premium for it. Similarly, a public
customer might also expect his potential losses to be relatively small and therefore want to
assure himself a low-cost forum. One must always bear in mind that the standard predispute
agreements work both ways, and that after a dispute has arisen there may be circumstances
where a customer will want arbitration and a broker-dealer will not. Cf. Exchange Act Re-
lease, supra note 67, 1 82,122, at 81,978 (spearate statement of views by Commissioner
Karmel) ("arbitration is an effective and worthwhile alternative to litigation for resolving dis-
putes which reduces the costs to both the customer and the broker-dealer"); see also infra note
135 (discussing one-way effect of arbitration agreements under exchange rules). The notice
that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires brokers to give their
customers also recognizes this point: "The CFTC recognizes that the opportunity to settle
disputes by arbitration may in some cases provide many benefits to customers, including the
ability to obtain an expeditious and final resolution of disputes without incurring substantial
costs." 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(6) (1986).
128. The historical background of the nonwaiver provision supports this interpretation.
The nonwaiver provisions derive from English securities statutes containing similar provisions.
Prior to enactment of the nonwaiver provisions, English common law courts had enforced
agreements in which customers waived compliance with the securities statutes' requirements.
See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1189 (1983).
129. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Culver Co. 13o also picked up on the argument that Wilko might be lim-
ited "to situations where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargaining
power, ... 131 but declined to address the question. Likewise, the Court
in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,132 remarked that the issue of
whether a predispute agreement was "a contract of adhesion.., subject
to close judicial scrutiny" was not before the Court.13 3 Thus, despite
Wilko's blurring of the issues, the Court has subsequently recognized the
distinct nature of this argument. And indeed, when courts openly face
the question whether a particular arbitration agreement is a contract of
adhesion, they routinely say "no.'
134
In the end, in nullifying an entire class of agreements, Wilko and the
cases that extend it to the 1934 Act may deprive the securities customer
of the benefits of arbitration should the broker-dealer decline to submit to
arbitration pursuant to a postdispute agreement. 135 It is unclear, there-
fore that Wilko's blanket rule redounds to the customer's advantage.
Moreover, Wilko's steamroller approach can be avoided through an
appropriate regulatory or self-regulatory scheme. Were the SEC to
adopt regulations requiring broker-dealers to give prospective customers
an informed and particularized choice to accept an arbitration clause or
not,136 or were the securities industry to adopt such a policy voluntarily,
130. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
131. Id. at 512 n.6.
132. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
133. Id. at 216 n.2.
134. Cases to this effect are legion. See, e.g., Coleman v. Prudential Bache See., Inc., 802
F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986); Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d
59, 61 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984).
135. The argument in text must be limited to the rights that a customer has under the
Arbitration Act and the securities laws, for the constitutions of at least some exchanges require
their members to arbitrate disputes with public customers even without an arbitration agree-
ment. See supra note 24. But given that the exhanges' rules are generally not thought to give
rise to a private right of action, see, e.g., Thompson v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co.,
709 F.2d 1413, 1419 (1lth Cir. 1983); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-81 (9th
Cir. 1980), it is doubtful that a claimant could enforce that obligation in his particular dispute.
(The exchange member, however, might be subject to disciplinary proceedings for any viola-
tion of the exchange's rules. See, e.g., Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
supra note 24, art. IX, § 5. The available sanctions include expulsion, suspension, fines and
"any other fitting sanction." Id.) Still, if the customer's agreement with the broker-dealer is
made subject to the rules and regulations of the exchange, the customer might argue that his
agreement incorporates the one-way arbitration provision of the exchange's constitution. Fur-
thermore, the customer might argue that he is a third-party beneficiary of the broker-dealer's
membership agreement with the exchange and seek to enforce the membership agreement
under the Arbitration Act, although it is not clear that he would have standing to do so,
Holding predispute arbitration agreements enforceable would have the advantage of eliminat-
ing these uncertainties.
136. At least one commentator has suggested exactly this approach. See Shell, Keep Bro-
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the basis of the Supreme Court's unfocused concern for voluntariness
would vanish altogether. Such a scheme already exists in the related field
of commodities trading.
In the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), Congress made specific
provision for predispute arbitration agreements. 137 Contract markets are
required to "provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration
or otherwise ... for the settlement of customers' claims and grievances
against any member or employee thereof."1 38 Futures associations can-
not be registered by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) unless "the rules of the association provide a fair, equitable and
expeditious procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement
of customers' claims and grievances against any member or employee
thereof." 139 Both sections contain the proviso that "the use of such pro-
cedure by a customer shall be voluntary."'' t
The CFTC has endorsed the concept of predispute arbitration agree-
ments and has taken measures to insure that such agreements are fair
and equitable, as well as voluntary.' 41 For example, an arbitration agree-
ment cannot be a mandatory condition of doing business; 4 2 the arbitra-
ker-Client Disputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at 34, col. 3. It is not clear, how-
ever, that the SEC has the statutory authority to impose such a requirement. See infra notes
157 and 194-204 and accompanying text.
137. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
138. Id. § 7a(l 1). When originally adopted in 1974, the arbitration procedures of section
7(a)(11) were limited to claims of $15,000 or less; the procedures of section 21(b)(10) were
limited to claims of $5,000 or less. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 209, 301, 88 Stat. 1389, 1401, 1408-09. In 1982, Congress removed
these limitations. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 217, 96 Stat. 2294, 2307.
The House committee reporting the bill remarked "that arbitration is an equally viable forum
for resolving customer claims in excess of $15,000 and there is no logical reason why repara-
tions should be the only out-of-court forum for resolution of these disputes." H.R. REP. No.
565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3871, 3905.
139. 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10).
140. Id. §§ 7a(ll)(i), 21(b)(10)(i).
141. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1 to 180.5. The regulation is reproduced in full infra in the
Appendix to this Article.
142. There are two senses in which an arbitration agreement might be voluntary. The first
is the CFTC sense: the arbitration agreement is independent of the remaining portions of the
agreement, and the customer is free to accept it or not, as he chooses. The second sense is that
the agreement is voluntary because the customer freely elects the entire agreement. This sec-
ond sense is meaningful because there are legions of broker-dealers eager to secure business,
and not all broker-dealers require arbitration agreements, particularly for cash accounts. See
Fletcher, supra note 73, at 447-48 & nn.347-51; Katsoris, supra note 25, at 292 n. 86, 306-09.
Of course, an arbitration agreement would also be voluntary in a third sense if it were in-
dependent of the remainder of the agreement, as in the CFTC arrangement, but the broker-
dealer were permitted to charge his nonarbitrating customers an annual fee that bore a reason-
able relation to higher expected costs of doing business.
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tion clause must be separately endorsed and must contain a fairly
substantial advisory statement to customers 143 concerning their legal
rights and the implications of the predispute arbitration agreement.144
Neither the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act provides similarly specific
instruction and authorization to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) to regulate predispute arbitration agreements. Nevertheless,
the SEC has already asserted the right to ban predispute arbitration
agreements altogether. 145 Moreover, under section 19(c) of the 1934
Act, the SEC has the power to:
abrogate, add to, and delete from ... the rules of a self-regula-
tory organization... as the Commission deems necessary or
appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regula-
tory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of this
Chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to
such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes
of this Chapter.... 146
Under this section, the SEC has the power to amend the exchanges' arbi-
143. The object of the notice (reprinted in full in Appendix), of course, is to provide infor-
mation that will enable the customer to make his decision with relatively complete knowledge
of the disadvantages of arbitration. It is in the broker's interest to disclose the advantages of
arbitration, because it will motivate the customer to agree to arbitration. Still, failure to dis-
close the advantages of arbitration, while perhaps foolish, will not render the arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable (provided that the broker does not attempt to enforce any portion of the
agreement that is contrary to CFTC regulations). See Olson v. Paine Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 742-44 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
Depending, of course, on the Supreme Court's holding and rationale in Shearson/Ameri-
can Express v. McMahon, lower courts may also wish to review Judge Posner's characteristi-
cally erudite opinion for the standards applicable in determining whether Wilko has been
effectively overruled. Id. at 741-42; see also infra text accompanying notes 279-92.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(6). The analogy between the securities context and the commod-
ities context is admittedly imperfect. An aggrieved commodities customer has three means of
pursuing his claim: a suit in court, civil reparations proceedings before the CFrC, and arbitra-
tion (if the customer's contract permits it). 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(1 1), 18, 25. Even if a commodities
customer has signed an arbitration agreement, he still has a choice between arbitration and
reparations. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(a). His situation is therefore somewhat different from that of a
securities customer, who does not have this alternative.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986). This regulation is discussed in infra text at notes 194-
204.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982); see also id. § 78s(b) (governing changes of rules proposed by
self-regulatory organizations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1986) (regulations regarding same); SEC
Release No. 16,390 (Nov. 30, 1979), 18 SEC DOCKET 1197, 1198 (1979) ("the proposed rule
change is consistent with the requirements of the Act... the rules and regulations... that are
applicable to national securities exchanges, and... with the requirements of Section 6(b)(5) of
the Act that the rules of an exchange be designed to promote just and equitable principles of
trade"); Exchange Act Release, supra note 67, 82,122, at 81,978 (separate statement of views
by Commissioner Karmel) ("[tio the extent the Commission considers changes in such [arbi-
tration] clauses [in customer agreements] necessary or appropriate to comport with just and
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tration rules, 147 as distinct from the arbitration agreements under which
the arbitration occurs and pursuant to which the rules are applied.1
4 8
Indeed, in its amicus brief in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 149 the SEC has shifted gears completely and disengaged its long-
standing opposition to predispute arbitration agreements, principally be-
cause of these powers. 50 Moreover, whether or not the SEC has the
power to require the CFTC's "separate agreement" arrangement, it un-
doubtedly has the power to require the broker-dealer to make disclosures
about the arbitration clause and its significance. 5'
Thus, to the extent that the voluntariness vel non of a predispute
arbitration agreement concerns the courts as a practical matter, the SEC
would appear already to have the power to address those concerns by at
least imposing disclosure requirements similar to those in force under the
CEA.152 Moreover, if the securities industry voluntarily adopts the pro-
cedures provided by the CEA and the CFTC, the Supreme Court may
someday be required to reassess Wilko in the context of an agreement
affirmatively shown to be fully voluntary.
V. BEYOND WILKO: ATTEMPTS TO REVAMP
THE REED-CLARK MODEL
The Reed-Clark model that the Wilko v. Swan' Court adopted
equitable principles of trade, requested changes should have been directed to SICA or appro-
priate industry self-regulatory organizations").
147. See generally Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 22; see also
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
13, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) [hereinafter SEC
Amicus Curiae Brief].
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 attempted to forbid arbitration agreements insofar as they per-
tained to federal claims.
149. 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
150. SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 147, at 13. This reversal of position is indeed a
sea-change, for in Wilko the SEC had appeared as amicus at each stage of the judicial process
and had vigorously opposed the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements. See
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427-28, 428 n.*; Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev'd, 201 F.2d 439, 441-42, rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also SEC Switches Stand on Arbitra-
tion Agreements, The Nat'1 L.J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 15, cols. 1-4.
151. Cf. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-16 (1986) (mandatory disclosure of interest terms in margin
account). Even a broker-dealer who will not do business with a customer who does not elect
arbitration would benefit from such a requirement, at least to some extent. The disclosure
would protect the broker-dealer from allegations of adhesion contracts if the disclosure advises
that other brokers may accept "nonarbitrating" customers.
152. Although the applicability of Wilko to predispute arbitration agreements regulated by
the CFTC is unsettled, the better view is that Wilko does not apply. Comment, Predispute
Agreements To Arbitrate Claims Arising Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 42 WASH. &
LEE L. Rnv. 939, 957-59 (1985).
153. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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was built upon the interrelationship of several sections of the 1933 Act.
Yet as Professor Katsoris has pointed out, the supporting provisions
which buttress Wilko's holding are either absent from or imperfectly rep-
licated in the 1934 Act. 15 4  District and appellate courts have suggested
several other arguments to supply the synergy for the 1934 Act that the
Wilko factors cannot. These are the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction,
the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act, and SEC administrative
interpretation.
4. Exclusivity: Exclusive of What?
One of the factors the Court in Wilko v. Swan 15 5 found significant
was the provision of concurrent jurisdiction over section 12(2) claims,
coupled with nationwide service of process, wide choice of venue, and
exemption from the general provisions for removal to federal court. In
other words, the section 12(2) plaintiff was guaranteed his right to hale
the broker-dealer into the plaintiff's chosen forum, and to keep him
there, even though the broker-dealer might find that forum grossly in-
convenient and perhaps substantially prejudicial. The 1934 Act curtailed
the number of forums available to the securities plaintiff by providing
exclusive federal jurisdiction."5 6 The reduction is indeed dramatic: the
number of forums is slashed from 1660 to 91.157
Nevertheless, one might argue that by granting the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction of 1934 Act claims, Congress meant to exclude not
only state courts, but all other forums as well. 5 On its face, this argu-
154. Katsoris, supra note 25, at 300-01.
155. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
156. See supra note 104.
157. The first number is the combined total number of federal district courts and state
courts of general jurisdiction; the second number is the number of federal courts (i.e. judicial
districts) only. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. III 1985); LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SURVEY OF COURT ORGANIZATION 3
(1973 & Supp. 1977). Of course, even with the broad venue provisions of the statutes, no
single plaintiff would ever have the realistic opportunity to pursue his claim in any and every
court in the country. Nevertheless these numbers point out the truly dramatic difference be-
tween the two statutes' jurisdictional provisions. Still, perhaps this numerical difference is not
so much dramatic as it is melodramatic. The legislative history of the 1934 Act's jurisdictional
provision might be read as indicating that Congress gave little thought to the question whether
federal jurisdiction should be exclusive or concurrent. See Note, The Securities Exchange Act
and the Rule of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 89 YALE L.J. 95, 109 n.58 (1979). But the
House of Representatives did give it at least some thought, as did the conference committee,
see id., and in examining the two statutes to find the exceedingly scarce indicia of congressional
intent on the arbitration issue, the few clues found should not be ignored.
158. Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Arbitration-Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985), 61 WASH. L. REv. 245, 259 (1986); cf.
Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("ac-
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ment seems to work a kind of logical sleight of hand: "Heads I win, tails
you lose." It is as if the Wilko Court had said, where there is concurrent
jurisdiction then it follows that the forum-selection provision cannot be
waived, but where there is exclusive jurisdiction, well, it still follows that
the forum-selection provision cannot be waived. Moreover, the argu-
ment ignores the realities of other statutory schemes providing for exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction. Although it is true that some such regimes have
been held to exclude arbitration, others have not. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit's views in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire
& Co.,159 that federal antitrust claims cannot be submitted to arbitration
pursuant to predispute agreements, 160 has been widely accepted.1 61 At
the opposite side, the Second Circuit's view that copyright claims are
arbitrable pursuant to predispute agreements162 has been said by another
court to be free from doubt.1 63 In other words, the mere fact of exclusive
federal jurisdiction over a claim does not determine whether arbitration
of such a claim is permitted.
Two other arguments might be advanced, however, for interpreting
tions arising under certain federal statutes which provide for exclusive federal court jurisdic-
tion.., even if between private parties, are considered to be of public concern, and thus as a
matter of public policy, generally have been held to be not justiciable in state court, or refera-
ble to arbitration"), aff'd, 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging
Indus., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[o]bviously, the patent infringement claim
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts... and may not be decided by...
arbitrators or... state courts"), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1975). The argument
that exclusive jurisdiction in itself precludes arbitration is also implicit in the "intertwining"
cases. See, eg., Lane v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 610, 612 (W.D. Okla. 1980)
("A court should deny arbitration [of state law claims] in order to preserve the exclusive juris-
diction of the federal courts over federal securities law claims. A party cannot render mean-
ingless the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities act claims by compelling
arbitration of ancillary pendent disputes." (citations omitted)); see also Note, Investor-Broker
Arbitration Agreements: Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 101, 105-06
(1985). The Supreme Court, of course, rejected this view in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985).
159. 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1968).
160. Id.
161. Six of the eleven circuits have held antitrust claims nonarbitrable. See Allison, supra
note 18, at 235 n.123. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this question, in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3361 (1985), the
Court held that private antitrust claims are arbitrable in the international context. The Mit-
subishi Court found it "unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American Safety doctrine as
applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transactions," and the Court rejected
several of the rationales that have been offered to justify American Safety. Id. at 3355-58. It is
doubtful that the domestic antitrust exception to the Arbitration Act will long survive
Mitsubishi.
162. Kamakazi, 684 F.2d at 231. The Kamakazi Court held only that copyright disputes on
anything other than the validity may be arbitrated.
163. American Concept v. Irsay, No. 84 C 10026 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1985).
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exclusive jurisdiction to be wholly exclusive. First, Congress might have
been concerned for the integrity of 1934 Act jurisprudence. Second, it
might have been concerned about uniformity. 64
The first argument is stated easily enough: by providing for exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction of 1934 Act claims, Congress prevented con-
struction of the statute from falling into the hands of non-Article III
judges. Perhaps in doing so, Congress intended to insure that only those
judges in whom it had confidence (and in whose selection and removal it
had a say) would be able to establish binding precedents. This concern,
however, is not implicated by arbitration, for as the Wilko Court noted,
arbitrators not only do not create binding precedent, they create no pre-
cedent at all-they do not publish opinions.165 Moreover, even if they
did, it is unclear that exclusive jurisdiction would benefit securities plain-
tiffs. On the one hand, while a plaintiff may have a legal advantage on
the burden of proof issue that might be lost in arbitration, a broker-
dealer is more likely to have some purely legal defenses, such as ratifica-
tion, which are at least as likely to be lost in arbitration. On the other
hand, a broker-dealer, more than an unsophisticated investor, might be
able to affect the selection 166 of state judges.
1 67
A second possible justification for exclusive federal jurisdiction is
the concern for uniformity (as opposed to integrity) of judicial interpreta-
tion.1 68  Reducing the number of forums from 1660 to 91 also reduced
the number of judges who could construe the statute. Here perhaps the
164. See Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 566 & n.129.
165. Barrett, Arbitration of a Complex Commercial Case: Practical Guidelines for Arbitra-
tors and Counsel, 41 THE ARBITRATION J., Dec. 1986, at 15, 23.
Unlike judges, arbitrators do not usually write opinions; indeed, they are discouraged
from doing so. Nevertheless they, like judges, must reason the case out. They must
feel that their award is firmly rooted in the record and is legally sound. Matters not
related to law or evidence can be appropriate in an arbitration brief. Arguments
addressed to business sense, the equities, and commercial realities, for example, will
be appropriate in certain cases.
Id. at 23. Labor arbitrators, however, sometimes issue opinions.
166. The means for such a program would presumably be entirely proper-for example,
contributions by a Political Action Committee (PAC) to a judge's campaign committee in a
retention election.
167. Nationwide broker-dealers, of course, may have a problem in affecting the selection of
so many judges nationwide, particularly as against their local institutional clients. Moreover,
the broker-dealer might more rationally conclude that the benefits of affecting a sufficient
number of judicial selections were significantly less than the costs of such a campaign.
168. That is, not whether judicial interpretations are correct, but whether they are relatively
consistent. These are separate concerns, though obviously they are closely related. As to some
issues, Congress may have been concerned that judicial interpretations be "correct" (and of
course uniformly so). In other instances, Congress may not have cared about the substance of
the interpretation, provided that whether "correct" or not, it was at least uniform.
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private nature of arbitration offers no succor, for it necessarily increases
the number of persons by whom a statute can be construed. Still, the
private nature of arbitration at least precludes the publication of these
"precedents," and it limits the effect of the construction to the particular
case. And again, it is likely that broker-dealers benefit from uniformity
of construction more than their customers (or at least their retail custom-
ers), for many broker-dealers are regional or national operations to
which uniform interpretations may have greater value for planning pur-
poses simply because of the regional or national scope of their operations.
Moreover, the right to seek judicial confirmation or vacation of arbitra-
tion awards permits the federal courts to preserve at least some degree of
uniformity and integrity.169
B. The 1975 Amendments
In 1975, Congress enacted substantial amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.170 The 1975 amendments did not specifically ad-
dress the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements between the
securities industry and its public customers. The amendments did, how-
ever, enact an explicit exception for intra-industry disputes, rendering
predispute agreements enforceable in that context. 171 Although the stat-
ute itself did not speak directly to public-customer agreements, one sen-
tence in the conference committee's report appears to comment on this
subject. The sentence reads in full as follows: "It was the clear under-
standing of the conferees that this amendment did not change existing
law, as articulated in Wilko, concerning the effect of arbitration proceed-
ing provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing with mem-
bers and participants of self-regulatory organizations."
1 72
There are several arguments buried within the seemingly simple his-
tory just narrated, and it is important to understand exactly which argu-
ment one is addressing. First, the conference committee's remarks might
be read as evidence of the original enacting Congress' intent as to predis-
pute agreements. Second, independent of the enacting Congress' intent,
the committee's remarks might be taken as a ratification of judicial inter-
pretation. Third, the statute itself, as distinguished from the committee
remarks, might be taken as a similar ratification. Fourth, the logic of the
169. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1982).
170. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
171. Id. § 21(1), 89 Stat. at 160 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982)).
172. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975), reprinted in part in
1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 321, 342.
674 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:643
statute might be such as to imply a position one way or the other on
predispute agreements.
1. Evidence of intent of enacting Congress
The first of these arguments is the weakest. One might find support
for the legal principle that a later Congress' views of a piece of legislation
are evidence of the enacting Congress' intentions,17 3 but this principle
must be handled gingerly. Just as there are many reasons why a party
might settle a case, there are many reasons why Congress might amend a
statute. In other words, the subsequent legislative action may not be in-
tended to communicate anything about a previous legislature's intent.
Additionally, two other observations make clear the weakness of using
post-enactment materials in this particular instance of legislative history.
First, the committee remarks do not so much purport to interpret the
1934 Act as they do the case law. The argument thus merges into the
second use of this history, congressional committee ratification. Second,
as will be seen below, the import of the committee's remarks is far from
clear.
2. Congressional committee ratification of judicial interpretation
The second form of the argument does not presuppose any particu-
lar intent on the part of the enacting Congress with respect to predispute
arbitration agreements. Rather, it simply says that the committee's re-
marks ratified judicial construction of the statute. In other words, the
committee discerned the interpretation that the courts have rendered and
simply endorsed it. This use of legislative history is fraught with difficul-
ties, both in theory and in this particular case. 74
To begin with, the conference committee sentence quoted above is
quite ambiguous. At the outset, all it tells us is that the conferees had a
"clear understanding" that the amendment did not change "existing
law," but it does not say that the conferees had a clear understanding of
what "existing law" provided. The conferees may have been deeply di-
vided on the point, or they may have given it little thought; all they did
know was that whatever the law was, they were not changing it. But
even assuming the committee did have an understanding that all agreed
upon, the quoted sentence does not disclose that understanding. All the
committee said was that it was not changing the rule "articulated in
173. See, eg., 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.11 (N. Singer 4th ed.
1984).
174. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 363, 374-88 (1982); id. at 395-409 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Wilko." ' 7  True, the committee might have been aware that lower courts
had extended the Wilko v. Swan 176 holding to claims arising under the
1934 Act, but it might also have been aware that Wilko itself did not
apply to the 1934 Act and that the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. 177 had expressed some doubt whether Wilko should apply to the
1934 Act. Perhaps if the committee had been correctly informed of the
limits of Wilko, it would not have wished to extend that decision. More-
over, since the report refers only to Wilko itself, and not to the then few
lower courts' decisions expanding its reach, the conference committee's
remark may also be read as limited to the 1933 Act, which section 28 of
the 1934 Act also affected. 17 The intra-industry exception set forth in
section 28 applies to all of Title 15, and not simply to the 1934 Act,
179
and the committee may simply have wished to make clear that the intra-
industry exception did not otherwise affect Wilko's construction of the
1933 Act.
A final aspect of this ambiguity is that even if the conference com-
mittee had authoritatively pronounced an intention that Wilko be applied
to the 1934 Act, this would not dispose of the special case of the right of
action implied under section 10(b). Wilko dealt solely with an express
right of action, and courts may well treat an implied right of action dif-
ferently. In other words, the committee may have approved the exten-
sion of Wilko to express private rights of action under the 1934 Act, but
not specifically to implied rights of action.
Given these ambiguities, the theoretical argument against commit-
tee ratification is much more persuasive in this context. It must be
remembered that the non-waiver provision was not itself amended in
1975. And as Justice Scalia noted (in another context) while still a mem-
ber of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
175. H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 94-229, supra note 172, at 111.
176. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
177. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
178. Some advocates have gone further still to say that since only one appellate court had
extended Wilko to the 1934 Act when the committee remarks were penned, and since Scherk
was decided during the same year as the remarks were written, the remarks actually meant
that the committee shared the doubts expressed in Scherk. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 18,
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) [hereinafter Petitioners'
Briefl.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b); see also Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 632 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1977) (claims under 1933 Act and 1934 Act). If "the party seeking to avoid arbitration is
a member of the Exchange ... then ... § 28(b) is applicable and overrides the nonwaiver
provisions which were the basis of Wilko." Id. at 636; see also N. Donald & Co. v. American
United Energy Corp., 585 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying § 28(b) to complaint
raising claims under 1933 Act, 1934 Act, RICO, and state statutes).
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[T]he authority of the committee report in the present case is
even more suspect than usual. Where a committee-generated
report deals with the meaning of a committee-generated text,
one can at least surmise that someone selected these statutory
words to convey this intended meaning. The portion of the re-
port at issue here, however, comments upon language drafted
in an earlier Congress, and reenacted, unamended so far as is
relevant to the present point, in the 1985 law.180
Congressional committees have no authority to legislate and courts
ought to be extremely circumspect in relying on remarks uncovered in
committee reports. That is particularly true when the court is simply
reading the committee report, and not the statute against the back drop
of the report.
3. Statutory ratification of judicial interpretation
The argument for ratification is stronger, however, when one turns
away from the committee report and to the statute itself. It may well be
that in the statute one might find language tending to imply ratification
of previous judicial constructions, perhaps reading the statute against the
background of a committee report. This argument of statutory ratifica-
tion tends to merge with the argument based on the logic of the statute,
so the two arguments are dealt with together.
At the general level, one might infer from legislative action on one
aspect of a statute that Congress implicitly accepted the judicial con-
struction of the remaining sections. At this level, the argument is not
terribly persuasive. After all, the issue of predispute arbitration agree-
ments is purely procedural. It is not central to the substantive regula-
tions created by Congress-unlike, for example, the argument that
Congress has ratified judicial inference of an implied right of action
180. Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir, 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). While still a member of the D.C. Circuit, Jus-
tice Scalia generally took a dim view of relying on committee reports for anything other than
broad outlines of congressional purpose:
But the authoritative, as opposed to the persuasive, weight of the Report de-
pends entirely upon how reasonable it is to assume that that rejection was reflected in
the law which Congress adopted. I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume
that the details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee
report come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts
the committee's bill. And I think it time for courts to become concerned about the
fact that routine deference to the detail of committee reports, and the predictable
expansion in that detail which routine deference has produced, are converting a sys-
tem of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription.
Id. at 7-8 (Scalia, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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under section 10(b). The 1975 amendments, however, supply more spe-
cific material, and here the argument is stronger.
The 1975 legislation amended section 28 of the 1934 Act to provide,
in essence, that arbitration agreements between or among members of the
securities industry would be enforceable. 181 From this statement of an
exception to the supposed general rule precluding enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements, one might infer that Congress intended to preclude any
other exceptions-expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'82  Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit recently accepted this argument:
Congress, in enacting a provision which it recognized would
permit arbitration between securities professionals, declined to
take further action. Congress was presumably aware that
courts had begun to extend Wilko to lOb-5 claims,... and that
the Supreme Court's only response had been to note in Seherk
that there was a "colorable argument" that Wilko was "not
controlling" in such cases. Yet Congress passed up a clear op-
portunity to disavow this trend.1
83
As a formal matter, the argument assumes its own conclusion. It
seizes upon section 28(b)184 and labels it an "exception" to section 29(a)'s
prohibition of required waivers. 85 It then says that from the existence of
one express exception without similar expression of other exceptions one
can infer that there are no other exceptions and that the general rule
therefore controls. The fallacy in the argument arises because it uses the
"exception" not to prove that there are no other exceptions but to prove
181. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 9429, § 21(1), 89 Stat. 97, 160
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b)). Section 21(1) of the 1975 Amendments added the following
language to § 28 of the 1934 Act:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to modify existing law with regard to the
binding effect (1) on any member of or participant in any self-regulatory organization
of any action taken by the authorities of such organization to settle disputes between
its members or participants, (2) on any municipal securities dealer or municipal se-
curities broker of any action taken pursuant to a procedure established by the Munic-
ipal Securities Rulemaking Board to settle disputes between municipal securities
dealers and municipal securities brokers, or (3) of any action described in paragraph
(1) or (2) on any person who has agreed to be bound thereby.
89 Stat. at 160.
182. For a general discussion of this legal maxim--"the expression of one is the exclusion of
another," see SUTHERLAND, supra note 173, §§ 47.23-47.25. For an insightful and critical
discussion of this maxim and its application, see Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REv. 761, 774-77, 778 (1987).
183. Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b). For the text of this section, see supra note 181.
185. See supra note 108 for the text of § 29(a).
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the existence of the general rule. The logical form of the argument runs
as follows:
a. Section 29(a) repeals the Arbitration Act and precludes en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements as to claims
raised under the 1934 Act;
b. Section 28(b) is an express exception to this rule;
c. The expression of one exception is the exclusion of others;
d. There are no further exceptions to the general rule; and
e. The general rule applies here and precludes enforcement of
the predispute arbitration agreements.
The argument doubles back and incorporates its first premise into its
conclusion. As a matter of logic, it proves nothing.
But perhaps the Eleventh Circuit was taking a much less formal
approach, appealing not so much to the expressio unius, exclusio alterius
canon of construction as to the much misunderstood expression "the ex-
ception proves the rule."' 86 But an exception proves a rule only if the
exception is of such a character that it naturally suggests the proposed
rule,' and section 28(b) does not do this. The Eleventh Circuit's argu-
ment assumes that the principal purpose of section 28(b) was to exempt
arbitration among exchange members from the antiwaiver provision of
section 29(a). But this mischaracterizes section 28(b)'s chief aim, which
was to preserve the self-regulatory function of exchanges. 18  Congress'
goal in enacting section 28(b) was to preserve the exchanges' ability to
promulgate rules governing their members' substantive behavior. 18 9 It is
true that section 28(b) also permits arbitration of disputes arising under
these rules,190 but this is merely incidental to the principal goal of the
section. Denying the exchanges control over the means of enforcing
their substantive rules would severely undermine the policy of self-regu-
lation.' 9' Consequently, the exchanges had to be given the power to
186. On the various meanings of this expression, see H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 176 (E. Gower 2d ed. 1965). In proper usage, the word "prove"
seems to have lost its denotation of "testing" or "putting to trial." See 2 COMPACT OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2339 (1971). The old proverb makes more sense with this meaning-
an exception tests a rule to determine whether there really is a rule after all.
187. Note that this method of proof is inductive, not deductive. As a matter of deductive
reasoning, an exception can neverprove, that is, demonstrate, a rule-only undermine it, or at
least force refinement of its terms.
188. Tullis, 551 F.2d at 638; Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838,
840-41 (2d Cir. 1971); N. Donald & Co., 585 F. Supp. at 535-36.
189. Axelrod & Co., 451 F.2d at 840 (citing SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt.l, at 3 (1963)).
190. Id.
191. Section 28(b) does not specifically mention arbitration. Rather, it preserves "the bind-
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choose the most appropriate means of enforcing their rules.192 This "ex-
ception" simply is not the kind that implies the general rule that the
Eleventh Circuit endorsed. Indeed, even the Eleventh Circuit was com-
pelled to "recognize that an inference from congressional silence is of
somewhat limited value." 193
C. The SEC and Administrative Interpretation: Regulation 15c2-2
In 1983, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a regula-
tion making it
a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a
broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public
customer which purports to bind the customer to the arbitra-
tion of future disputes between them arising under the federal
securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant
to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
194
This regulation has been cited as authority for construing the 1934 Act to
preclude enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements 195 although
the SEC's recent change of position in its amicus brief in Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, Inc. v. McMahon 196 to some degree puts this regulation in
limbo. An analysis of the history and logic of Rule 15c2-2, however,
leads inescapably to the conclusion that it provides no authority for pre-
cluding enforcement of arbitration agreements, independent of the SEC's
current position.
Regulation 15c2-2 finds its origins in a 1979 SEC interpretive re-
lease.197 In this release, the SEC explained that under then-current law,
predispute arbitration clauses were unenforceable under both the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act.' 98 Because of this understanding, the Commis-
sion concluded that it would be "misleading to customers to require exe-
cution of any customer agreement which does not provide adequate
disclosure about the meaning and effect of its terms, particularly any pro-
ing effect ... on any member of... any self-regulatory organization of any action taken by the
authorities of such organization to settle disputes between its members .... " 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(b).
192. Tullis, 551 F.2d at 638. This choice, however, was subject to the SEC's oversight. See
supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
193. Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1038.
194. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1986).
195. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393, 1398 n.17 (8th Cir.
1986) (rejecting appellees' argument from Rule 15c2-2), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W.
3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578).
196. 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
197. Exchange Act Release, supra note 67, 82,122, at 81,976-81,977.
198. Id.
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vision which might lead a customer to believe that he or she has waived
prospectively rights under the federal securities law .... "1
99
The SEC revisited this subject in 1983. At that time, the Commis-
sion once again looked to the statutes and the still-uniform judicial inter-
pretation of the 1934 Act, and concluded that the "federal securities laws
... provide that broker-dealer agreements purporting to bind public cus-
tomers to the arbitration of disputes arising in the future are void and
unenforceable as applied to claims arising under those laws." 00 Quoting
the Sixth Circuit's language in a recent decision,201 the SEC said that
"'[c]ourts have consistently held that Wilko's holding and rationale
[under the Securities Act of 1933] are equally applicable to cases arising
under the 1934 Act.' ,202
Viewing regulation 15c2-2 against this background displays the logi-
cal fallacy of relying on this regulation for any authority whatsoever.
The SEC did not even purport to conduct an independent analysis of the
statute, its history, or its application within the securities context. All it
did was read the volumes of Federal Reporter, Second Series, and con-
clude that under the law, predispute agreements constituted "a fraudu-
lent, manipulative, or deceptive act or practice."203 Yet this regulation
and its history are offered as an authoritative interpretation of section 29
of the 1934 Act. The logic of this analysis, however, is deeply flawed; it
proceeds as follows:
1. The Commission perceives the law to be X;
2. For a broker to say the law is non-X is to mislead the cus-
tomer into believing that the law in fact is non-X
3. If it is misleading to say that the law is non-X, then the law
must in fact be X.
199. Id. S 82,122, at 81,978. Commissioner Karmel disagreed with the views expressed in
the Release. Id. (separate statement of views by Commissioner Karmel). Her views on arbi-
tration are reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko v. Swan.
200. Recourse to the Courts Notwithstanding Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer Cus-
tomer Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,357 (Nov. 18, 1983) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release].
201. First Heritage Corp. v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 710 F.2d 1205, 1207 (6th Cir. 1983).
202. Exchange Act Release, supra note 200, % 83,452, at 86,357.
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1982); Exchange Act Release, supra note 200, q 83,452, at 86,356.
("The Commission's Rule codifies its longstanding view that such clauses are inconsistent with
the deceptive practice provisions of section 10(b) [15 U.S.C. 78j(b)] and section 15(c) [15
U.S.C. 78o(c)] of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.. ." (bracketed information in origi-
nal)). The 1983 Exchange Act Release, supra note 200, did not conduct any new analysis of
the 1934 Act's non-waiver provision, it simply pointed to "Wilko ... and subsequent cases"
and referenced the Commission's own "longstanding view ...." Id. 83,452, at 86,356-57.
In the 1979 Exchange Act Release, supra note 67, the Commission had mentioned Scherk but
without addressing, much less answering, the questions raised there.
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The circularity of this form of reasoning is painfully obvious. The argu-
ment collapses back into itself.2°4
Even assuming, however, that in promulgating Regulation 15c2-2
the SEC had analyzed the 1934 Act and interpreted it as barring enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration agreements, one must hesitate to give this
interpretation much credence. In offering such an interpretation, the
SEC would not merely be interpreting the 1934 Act, with which it might
be presumed to have some special expertise; rather, it would be consider-
ing the interplay between two statutes, the enforcement of only one of
which is entrusted to the SEC. It is extremely doubtful that Congress
intended to give the SEC authority to use its powers of expert interpreta-
tion to, in effect, repeal the Arbitration Act.
VI. STATUTORY AND PUBLIC POLICY ANALOGIES
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on arguments concern-
ing the language and structure of specific statutory provisions of the se-
curities laws. The judicially recognized exceptions to the Arbitration
Act, however, extend beyond the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Courts have
found exceptions to the Arbitration Act based on the public policy un-
derlying patent, copyright, antitrust, civil rights, and other statutes, and
although Wilko v. Swan2 °5 was not based on a generalized public policy
exception, it has frequently been cited for that proposition.2 °6
The following discussion of a handful of these statutory exceptions
will not attempt to offer a unified theory of these exceptions. Indeed, it
204. In fact, the language of Regulation 15c2-2 itself, as opposed to that of the interpretive
releases, does not necessarily implicate the use of predispute clauses to compel arbitration of
claims arising under the 1934 Act. The regulation makes it a fraudulent practice to create or
preserve a clause requiring arbitration of a dispute arising "under the federal securities laws,"
but it does not say which federal securities laws. Although one answer might be "all of them
(including the 1934 Act)," an equally plausible answer is "those under which such clauses are
unenforceable." In other words, the regulation can be read as taking no position on which
federal securities laws preclude enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements. The regula-
tion's use of the phrase "purports to bind" makes the second readings perhaps a bit more
linguistically plausible, since "purports" mieans "to have the appearance, often the specious
appearance, of being, intending, claiming, etc. (that which is implied or inferred)." WEB-
STER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2017 (2d ed. 1946); see also United States v. 306
Cases Containing Sandford Tomato Catsup With Preservative, 55 F. Supp. 725, 727
(E.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945).
205. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
206. See, eg., Allison, supra note 18, at 233-34. And, conversely, although Wilko was not
based on a public policy exception, the public nature and purposes of the securities laws and
the public policy exception to the Arbitration Act, have frequently been offered as arguments
against the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in the securities context. See
Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 22, at 120.
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may not be possible to explain these decisions coherently without resort
to the crudest form of legal realism.20 7 Consideration of these cases,
however, will at least engender a healthy skepticism which will prove
useful when the arbitrability of RICO claims is considered.
A. Arbitration Agreements and Intellectual Property Law
The field of intellectual property law provides an oddly variegated
application of the "public" rights exception. In the patents area, a long-
standing judicial gloss (recently overruled by statute) held that validity
and infringement claims were not arbitrable. Prior to enactment of the
statute that reversed this line of cases, copyright infringement, but not
copyright validity, was arbitrable. In the trademark field, even validity
appears to have been arbitrable.
It is appropriate that the patent-disputes exception to the Arbitra-
tion Act should begin and end in a statute. First recognized in 1930, the
patent exception is the granddaddy of all "public rights" exceptions. In
Zip Manufacturing Co. v. Pep Manufacturing Co.,20 8 the federal district
court in Delaware faced the novel question of construction of an act that
had been passed a scant five years earlier, the Arbitration Act. The com-
plaint alleged patent infringement, and a predispute agreement specifi-
cally provided that "the question of validity and infringement shall be
determined by arbitration."20 9 Pursuant to this agreement, the defendant
moved for a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration.210 The
court faced the initial question of whether an "issue referable to
arbitration" in section 3 of the Arbitration Act meant the same as "con-
troversy" in section 2.211 Determining that the two phrases were synony-
mous for the purposes at hand, the court then considered whether the
questions of validity and infringement were "controversies" arising out
of "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... ,2.2
The court concluded that the validity and infringement questions "re-
late[d] to a controversy involving neither commerce nor a maritime
transaction, as defined in the Act, and therefore [agreements to arbitrate
these claims are] not enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act." '213
The court based this finding on a brief examination of the Arbitration
Act's legislative history and contemporaneous discussions of its pur-
207. For a valiant and helpful attempt, however, see generally Sterk, supra note 39.
208. 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930).
209. Id. at 185-86.
210. Id. at 184.
211. Id. at 185.
212. Id. at 185 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
213. Id. at 186.
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pose.2 14 After quoting a passage written by one of the Act's advocates
concerning the typical questions that were expected to be resolved by
arbitration under the Act, the court added this observation: "The deter-
mination of the status of a patent, its validity or invalidity, its infringe-
ment or noninfringement, is a matter that is inherently unsuited to the
procedure of arbitration statutes. 21  This appears to have been the birth
of the public policy exception to the Arbitration Act. Although the pub-
lic policy issue was a secondary concern for the Zip court, that dictum is
the language for which it is remembered. Its abstruse statutory analysis
lost out to the much more easily wielded public policy argument.216
In 1982, Congress legislatively overruled the patent version of the
public policy exception.2 17 The 1982 amendments to the patent laws spe-
cifically authorize both predispute and postdispute arbitration agree-
ments extending to the issue of patent validity or infringement.218 The
amendments use the language of section 3 of the Arbitration Act to
render such agreements enforceable.21 9
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 62-63 (7th Cir.
1970) ("patent validity questions... are inappropriate for arbitration proceedings and should
be decided by a court of law, given the great public interest in challenging invalid patents");
Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("the
public has an important interest in the determination of patent validity and infringement, even
though those issues may be decided in the context of a private lawsuit.... [IT]he grave public
interest in questions of patent validity and infringement renders them inappropriate for deter-
mination in arbitration proceedings.") (footnotes omitted); Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg.
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 141, 143 (W.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963). Interest-
ingly enough, although Beckman is cited in conjunction with Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44
F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930), as one of the fonts of the public policy exception, the language just
quoted is dictum. The holding of the court was that the patent validity question did not fall
within the scope and intent of the arbitration agreement. Beckman, 433 F.2d at 62.
217. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. 97-247, 96 Stat. 322 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982)).
The section is captioned "Voluntary Arbitration," underscoring the concern that arbitration
should be voluntary. See supra notes 121-52 and accompanying text. In 1984, Congress simi-
larly amended the patent interference statute, 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (Supp. III 1985). Section 294
incorporates the language of § 2 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), and both § 294
and § 135(d) provide for enforcement in accordance with the Arbitration Act, subject to the
more specific provisions of the patent arbitration provisions. 35 U.S.C. §§ 135(d), 294(b).
218. 35 U.S.C. § 294. For the practical and procedural implications of this amendment, see
Dresser, Agreements to Arbitrate Patent Disputes, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 551
(1985).
219. Section 294 is carefully drafted to ensure the proper balance between competing public
and private concerns. It permits both predispute and postdispute arbitration agreements. 35
U.S.C. § 294(a). It explicitly requires arbitrators to consider the statutory affirmative defenses
to patent infringement, id. § 294(b), but it also provides that an arbitration award has no
binding effect on nonparties and that a subsequent judicial declaration of invalidity or unen-
forceability may be used to modify an arbitration award. Id. § 294(c). It also provides that the
arbitration award is unenforceable until the patentee fies notice with the Commissioner of
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The enacting Congress took no position on whether the Zip line of
cases had correctly interpreted the Arbitration Act or had properly cre-
ated a public policy exception to the Act.22° The 1982 amendment, how-
ever, clearly rejects the public policy exception (at least in the patent
context), and the remarks of the reporting committee support this con-
clusion: "[A] statutory authorization of voluntary agreements to arbi-
trate validity and infringement disputes would benefit both the parties to
these disputes and the public." '221 The committee cited two types of ad-
vantages to the public that would result from arbitrability of patent
disputes. "First, the availability of arbitration with its numerous advan-
tages will enhance the patent system and thus will encourage innovation
... . Secondly, arbitration could relieve some of the burdens on the
overworked Federal Courts.
222
The second of these two advantages to the public is directly transfer-
able to the securities context, and it highlights a significant fallacy in the
entire policy-based approach to enforcement of the Arbitration Act. In
each of the "public policy statutes" that Congress enacts, there is obvi-
ously a public policy favoring the enforcement of the statute. The Arbi-
tration Act, however, represents a "public policy" choice as well: it
endorses as public policy the enforcement of agreements to use a form of
dispute resolution that is undoubtedly less costly to the parties and the
public. 223 That decision represents a balancing of the public and private
costs and benefits of judicial dispute resolution. Judicial refusal to accept
the congressional decision of this balancing not only reflects a revived
judicial hostility to arbitration, but it also upsets the congressional bal-
ance and imposes higher costs on the administration of congressional
policies.
The first public advantage that the committee statement suggested
can be found in the securities context as well, although it cannot be
mechanically transplanted. The availability of arbitration for securities
disputes has the net result of reducing broker-dealers' expected costs, a
savings which might be expected to result in lower prices to the cus-
tomer. If the investor's costs associated with investment are reduced (or,
viewing the matter differently, if his return is increased), he can be ex-
Patents and Trademarks; the notice becomes part of the record of prosecution of the patent,
Id. §§ 294(d)-(e).
220. See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
221. Id. at 13.
222. Id.
223. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("failure to accord immediate
review ... might 'seriously erode federal policy' "); (Congress created a "substantive rule" to
protect the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
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pected to increase his investments (or at least realize a greater return on
his existing investments)."2 4 In other words, the availability of arbitra-
tion in securities disputes might enhance capital formation.225
In the other two analogous areas of intellectual property law, the
enforceability of arbitration agreements is unsettled. Some cases have
held that, as in the patent area, copyright matters other than validity
itself can be determined in arbitration,226 and one court appears to have
held that all copyright claims, including validity, are arbitrable.a27 In the
trademark area, validity appears to be arbitrable.a 8 In any event, it
would seem unlikely that any public policy exception to arbitrability in
the intellectual property area will survive the 1982 amendments to the
patent laws,229 particularly since the first court to address the issue of
copyright arbitrability placed great reliance on the jurisprudence of pat-
ent arbitrability.23 °
224. The author concedes that this economic analysis is at best in skeletal form.
225. True, this economic analysis is by no means conclusive, and in any event the extent to
which capital formation might be assisted is not at all clear. Nevertheless, this represents one
of the outcomes of Congress' balancing of public policies, and that balance should not be upset
by the courts.
226. Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 522 F. Supp. 125, 131 (1981) ("Vari-
ous issues arising in a dispute involving a trademark, patent, and copyright may be arbitrated
with the exclusion, perhaps, of the validity of the federally protected interest itself. . . .
aff'd, 684 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982). The court continued:
The only "public interest" in a copyright claim concerns the monopoly inherent in a
valid copyright. The validity of the copyrights here, and therefore the existence of
the monopoly, was not determined by the arbitrator, but by the District Court. Con-
sequently, we see no public policy against arbitration of this claim for the infringe-
ment of a valid copyright.
Id. at 231.
227. American Concept v. Irsay, No. 84 C 10026 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1985) (copyright claims
are arbitrable).
228. Givenchy S.A. v. William Stuart Indus. (Far East), No. 85 Civ. 9911 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
10, 1986) ("There is little question that, under the law of this circuit, both of these disputes are
amenable to arbitration."); Saucy Susan Prods., Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F. Supp.
724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (dictum) ("[P]laintiff does not urge that there is a public policy
against arbitrating plaintiff's claims of trademark infringement .... [I]t does not appear that
an agreement to arbitrate future disputes would thwart Congressional policy.") (footnote omit-
ted); cfi. Hikers Indus. v. William Stuart Indus., 640 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
229. See Warner & Swasey Co. v. Salvagnini Transferica S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 1209, 1212
(W.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[T]he court in [Diematic Mfg. Corp.] ... held that patent infringement
claims may be heard only by federal courts, not arbitrators (or state courts). However, the
force of the Diematic case has been undercut by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 294."). Only one other
court has mentioned the 1982 amendment to § 294. See Rhone-Poulenc Specialties Chimiques
v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The entire "discussion" follows: "Consistent
with the intent of the parties when they entered into the contract here, the right to arbitrate
has since been guaranteed by enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 294." Id. at 1572 n.l. The Rhone-
Poulenc court enforced an agreement to arbitrate even though the agreement had been entered
into more than three years prior to both the enactment and effective date of § 294.
230. Kamakazi, 522 F. Supp. at 130.
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B. Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Law
While the public policy exception to the Arbitration Act for patent
law disputes is the oldest, the antitrust exception is perhaps the most
debated. In 1968, the Second Circuit held in American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.231 that an agreement to arbitrate antitrust
claims was unenforceable.2 32 Technically, the court might have limited
its holding to a predispute arbitration agreement, which was all that the
facts of American Safety presented.2 33 The Second Circuit, however, ini-
tially ignored this distinction and held that "antitrust claims.., are inap-
propriate for arbitration.
2 34
The Second Circuit based its decision on unabashedly policy-
oriented concerns. The court noted first that an antitrust action involved
more than merely the parties to the lawsuit. Rather, an antitrust viola-
tion, and therefore the outcome of an antitrust action, "can affect hun-
dreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of people and inflict staggering
economic damage. '2 35 Next, the court noted the possibility that an arbi-
tration agreement might be both a contract of adhesion and an instru-
ment for furthering the monopolist's scheme. Third, the court con-
sidered that antitrust issues were too complex and the evidence too ex-
tensive for arbitrators. Fourth, the court suggested that it would be inap-
propriate for the business community that was regulated by antitrust
laws to supply the judges in disputes and that, in any event, commercial
arbitrators would not have the expertise necessary to consider "issues of
great public interest." '236
The considerations raised in American Safety, as well as those raised
by other courts and commentators, have been refuted effectively, though
perhaps not unanswerably, elsewhere .21 As Professor Allison has noted,
an antitrust plaintiff will have an interest in vindicating his claim,
231. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
232. Id. at 828.
233. Id. at 822.
234. Id. at 828. Subsequently, however, the Second Circuit did limit the holding to predis-
pute agreements. See Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
235. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
236. Id. at 827. Perhaps even the Second Circuit recognized the dubious merits of one of its
arguments, that arbitrators would not have the requisite expertise to decide antitrust cases.
Given the language in which the court articulated its objection, antitrust arbitration would
seem almost more a breach of etiquette than a violation of legal norms or public policy. The
court's language--"it hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues"-makes one
wonder whether the public policy that the Second Circuit was enforcing had been decreed by
Amy Vanderbilt. See id.
237. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 18.
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whether its resolution is relegated to arbitration or the courts.238 The
argument that a monopolist might use an arbitration agreement to fur-
ther its scheme has been rejected; a monopolist is not likely to be so
foolish as to expose its machinations to the inspection of outsiders, be
they public judges or private arbitrators. The suggestion that antitrust
issues are any more complex and the evidence any more extensive than in
difficult commercial cases is highly suspect.239 Finally, the argument
that the business community ought not to be a judge in its own cause is
based on an unlikely premise: it assumes that arbitrators will favor the
monopolist rather than the victimized fellow businessman.
This Article is not concerned, however, with addressing in detail the
arguments for and against an antitrust public policy exception to the Ar-
bitration Act. Whatever one may say of the merits of the American
Safety doctrine, the doctrine has a different basis than the exception ar-
ticulated in Wilko v. Swan.2 ° The author has already discussed the view
that Wilko was rooted chiefly in a concern that predispute agreements
were not voluntary.241 A different point is made here, namely that Wilko
does not support any broad policy-based exception to the Arbitration
Act, even though the American Safety court cited Wilko in support of its
own decision not to enforce the arbitration agreement. In the words of
the Second Circuit, in Wilko, "the Supreme Court frankly recognized a
similar collision of public policies and faced up to it; we must do no less
here. '242 The Second Circuit simply misread Wilko.
At the end of its opinion, the Wilko Court included a paragraph
which began as follows: "Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are in-
238. Id. at 255-59. True, the plaintiff may not have the same level of interest in arbitration
as he might in judicial proceedings. For example, if it were empirically demonstrable that
arbitrators never award treble damages, then the amount of resources that a plaintiff was will-
ing to invest in his lawsuit would diminish if predispute arbitration agreements were enforcea-
ble. The same would not necessarily hold true for postdispute arbitration agreements, for
presumably at that point the plaintiff determined that the benefits of arbitration exceeded the
costs, including the lesser probable reward. In contrast, a predispute arbitration agreement
would entail a different cost-benefit analysis; the parties seeking the arbitration agreement pre-
sumably could offer the would-be plaintiff benefits unrelated to a prospective antitrust action.
239. Perhaps antitrust cases are more complex than the average commercial case that does
not raise antitrust issues, and perhaps antitrust cases as a class can be screened out of arbitra-
tion in a way that other complex cases cannot. It is, after all, easy to determine whether a case
raises an antitrust claim, but at what point in the continuum does a purely "commercial" case
become too complex for arbitrators? In any event, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), dismissed the premise of the
argument-that arbitrators are not equipped for complex cases. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357-
58.
240. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 121-28.
242. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
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volved in this case."243 The difference between Wilko and American
Safety, however, is quite obvious. Wilko was not concerned with a gener-
alized public policy exception24" of judicial provenance. Rather, it was
concerned with the policy of the statute; even more, it was concerned
with construction of a particular section of that statute-the nonwaiver
provision. The antitrust laws, however, have no similar provision pre-
cluding waiver of statutory rights or the procedures available to vindicate
those rights. In other words, in Wilko, the Supreme Court at least had a
linguistic peg on which to hang its policy hat. The antitrust laws are not
so hospitable. Indeed, the American Safety court did not cite to any pro-
vision of the federal antitrust laws to support its conclusion that federal
antitrust claims are exempted from the Arbitration Act.
C. Civil Rights, Labor Law, and Arbitration Agreements
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,245 the Supreme Court briefly
addressed the question of the preclusive effect to be accorded to arbitra-
tion awards in subsequent judicial proceedings, an issue that had trou-
bled several lower courts in deciding the "intertwining" issue. The Court
determined that ordinary preclusion rules would not necessarily apply to
an unreviewed arbitration award rendered prior to judicial proceedings
in a securities action.246 The reasons the Court offered for rejecting pre-
clusion have some bearing on the analogous question of whether civil
rights actions may be arbitrated under predispute agreements.
In McDonald v. West Branch,247 the Supreme Court held that a la-
bor arbitration proceeding would not have preclusive effect in an action
brought under section 1983.248 The Court offered four reasons for its
decision. First, the Court believed that the labor arbitrator's expertise
lay in labor relations, not law. Second, an arbitrator may not have con-
tractual authority to enforce section 1983 claims. Third, the labor union
usually has exclusive control over whether and when to present a griev-
ance through arbitration. Fourth, arbitration does not afford the same
procedural and evidentiary advantages available in litigation.249
243. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
244. Cf. Sterk, supra note 39, at 483: "To say that public policy prohibits arbitration in a
particular instance explains little; 'public policy' is a catchphrase elusive of meaning without
reference to the context in which it is used."
245. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
246. Id. at 222-23.
247. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
248. Id. at 292. The Court's holding applies to both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Id.
249. Id. at 290-91.
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It must be stressed that in McDonald, the question before the Court
was not whether a predispute agreement to arbitrate a section 1983 claim
could be enforced; neither was the issue enforcement of a postdispute
arbitration agreement. Rather, the question the Court addressed was
whether a labor arbitration of a claimed violation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement would have preclusive effect in judicial proceedings in
a section 1983 action,250 given that the two claims were based on the
same factual predicate.25 '
With this background, the McDonald Court's first and second ratio-
nales have no applicability in the area of arbitrability of securities dis-
putes. As to the first, the Uniform Code of Arbitration 252 provides that a
public customer may insist that a majority of the arbitration panel con-
sist of industry representatives; if he does not make this demand, then a
majority of the panel must consist of public representatives. 3 In other
words, under the Uniform Code, the securities claimant is entitled to
determine, within reasonable limits, the type of expertise that the arbitra-
tion panel will possess. The Court's second rationale is even more sus-
pect in the securities context. The Court in Wilko v. Swan 254 held that
arbitrators are bound to apply the 1933 Act in the disputes that they
adjudicate 5 and there is no basis for distinguishing arbitrators' obliga-
tion to enforce the 1934 Act.
The McDonald Court's third reason obviously does not apply in the
securities context. Because of the collective nature of the labor grievance
procedure, the union controls the aggrieved party's case before the arbi-
trators. The securities claimant, on the other hand, retains full control
over the arbitration proceeding.
250. Id. at 285.
251. In the arbitration proceeding, McDonald claimed that he had been discharged without
"proper cause" and therefore in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 285-86
& n.2. In his section 1983 civil action, he alleged that he had been discharged "for exercising
his First Amendment Rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to
petition the government ...." Id. at 286. (The jury rejected his additional claim for depriva-
tion of property without due process. Id. at 286 n.4.) The arbitrator found that there was
proper cause for McDonald's termination. Id. Presumably, McDonald's exercise of his first
amendment rights would not constitute "proper cause," and the arbitrator's finding therefore
meant that McDonald had been dismissed for other reasons. (There does remain the possibil-
ity of dual causation, however, and perhaps the arbitrator did not consider this possibility.)
252. UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION § 8(a), reprinted in FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION (Apr. 1986) (Exhibit C).
253. Id. § 19, V 3719 at 3716. Professor Shell has called for a redefinition of the term "pub-
lic representative." See supra note 136.
254. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
255. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34.
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The Court's last rationale is perhaps the strongest of the four in its
application to the securities context, and it is also the most familiar. It is
true that arbitration does not offer the full panoply of procedural safe-
guards available in litigation; that is both its virtue and its vice. But it is
precisely those advantages that the securities claimant agrees to forego in
a predispute agreement; this distinguishes a securities agreement from
the collective bargaining agreement. The individual laborer is not a sig-
natory to the labor agreement and cannot be presumed to have delegated
to the union (perhaps as an agent against his will) the authority to arbi-
trate his civil rights, as opposed to his collective bargaining rights. Re-
gardless of the degree to which the securities customer's agreement can
be characterized as "voluntary," it is assuredly the customer's agreement,
and not some union's. In other words, the question once again resolves
itself into the voluntariness vel non of the predispute arbitration agree-
ment and whether that is a material question in the construction of a
nonwaiver provision.
VII. ARBITRABILITY OF RICO CLAIMS IN
THE SECURITIES CONTEXT
When RICO claims are asserted in securities cases, they are rou-
tinely based on the same nucleus of facts as the claims under the conven-
tional securities laws. And of course, the same predispute agreements
that require arbitration of common-law claims also require arbitration of
RICO claims-unless RICO forbids enforcement of such agreements.
25 6
The appellate and district courts are deeply divided on this issue. In
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,2"7 the Second Circuit
held that RICO claims could never be compelled into arbitration pursu-
ant to predispute agreements. In Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
256. Much turns on identification of the statute from which the public policy exception
emanates. If the substantive statute (e.g., the Sherman Act) is the source of the public policy
exception, then the exception cannot apply to state statutes that create similar policy excep-
tions: the Supremacy Clause requires enforcement of the Arbitration Act. If the public policy
exception is rooted in the Arbitration Act, then it is at least possible that the federal policy
exception also protects state policies. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), how-
ever, the Court declined to extend any policy exception to state statutory claims. This refusal
implies either that the policy exception (to the extent that it exists at all) emanates from the
substantive federal laws, or that if it emanates from the Arbitration Act, its application is
limited to federal statutes.
257. 788 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). The First Circuit agreed
with the Second Circuit on the RICO issue, but agreed with the Eighth Circuit on the 1934
Act issue. Page v. Mosley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291, 298-300 (Ist Cir.
1986).
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ner & Smith, Inc.,258 the Third Circuit held that RICO claims could be
arbitrated under predispute agreements only if the predicate acts25 9 on
which the RICO claim is based are arbitrable under such agreements.
And in Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin,26 the Fifth Circuit held that at least in
the securities context, all RICO claims are referrable to arbitration under
predispute agreements.
RICO contains no antiwaiver provision similar to section 14 of the
1933 Act or section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. Unless one accepts the Third
Circuit's rather baroque approach, therefore, the enforceability of predis-
pute arbitration agreements in the RICO context turns solely on the pub-
lic policy exception to the Arbitration Act. If there is no such policy or if
it does not apply in this context, then RICO claims are fully arbitrable.
The Second Circuit in McMahon embraced a "public policy" justifi-
cation for precluding arbitration of RICO claims. Although the court
referred to its decision in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. £P.
Maguire & Co.,261 the court did not identify the specific public policy
reasons to which it referred.262 One might postulate as many policy ar-
guments as have arisen in the antitrust context,263 but only one seems
truly significant: the effect of the defendant's conduct on the general
public and identifiable third parties. To understand this external effect,
however, it is necessary to understand the type of conduct that RICO
makes actionable.
RICO does not prohibit single acts in themselves. Instead it aims at
whole series of acts that create a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 211
The extent of any "public policy" in RICO depends on the definition of
"pattern." If a "pattern of racketeering activity" could be established
simply by showing that a defendant has committed one or more isolated
acts of fraud, then there would be little reason to preclude arbitration.
258. 797 F.2d 1197, 1203 (3d Cir.),petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Sept. 25,
1986) (No. 86-487). The Eleventh Circuit has sided with the Third Circuit's decision in Jacob-
son. Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d 1337, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Eleventh Circuit suggested that the Second and Third Circuits had come to the same
result. Given that the Second Circuit relied on its decision in American Safety Equip. Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), however, it is impossible to read the deci-
sions in tandem.
259. The term means the "independently prohibited acts" (defined as "racketeering activ-
ity" in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1982)) that form the "pattern of racketeering activity" (defined in
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982)).
260. 803 F.2d 157, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1986).
261. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
262. See Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202.
263. For a detailed list of these arguments and responses to each, see, e.g., Allison, supra
note 18.
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
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The damages for each of the separate acts of fraud can be fully satisfied
in arbitration because all relevant parties are present. However, under a
stricter definition of "pattern," there is arguably more reason to preclude
arbitration. For example, in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,265 the Eighth
Circuit held that a "pattern of racketeering" could not be predicated on
"one isolated fraudulent scheme. '2 66 That is, the court required more
than two unconnected acts and more than even a series of connected acts.
Under Superior Oil, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had "en-
gaged in other criminal activities elsewhere." '267 Pursuant to this stricter
definition of "pattern," a defendant's conduct affects persons other than
those represented in the given proceeding. One might argue that these
third persons' interests should not be relegated to arbitration and ex-
cluded from the protections afforded by the federal judiciary.
This argument is flawed in at least two respects. First, the third
persons affected by the defendant's conduct are by hypothesis identifi-
able. Unlike antitrust violations, the RICO offense in the securities
context does not have widespread repercussions rippling indiscriminately
through the market. They directly affect only identifiable individuals,2 68
and these individuals can pursue relief themselves should they so de-
sire.2 69 Second, at least in the securities context, if one victim of the
alleged racketeering pattern has signed an arbitration agreement, it is
likely that the other alleged victims have done so as well.270 Permitting a
plaintiff to evade arbitration by pleading RICO thus voids not one, but
several arbitration agreements in one stroke.
The Third Circuit agreed that a general public policy exception
could not justify precluding arbitration of RICO claims.271 Having re-
jected this basis, the Third Circuit determined that it must look to the
"predicate statutes" on which the RICO claim was based. 2  The Jacob-
265. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
266. Id. at 257.
267. Id.
268. There is, however, a general public interest in reducing the number of criminals at
large and in decreasing their economic resources.
269. Cf Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977) (indirect purchasers have
no standing to challenge federal antitrust violation).
270. If the particular broker-dealer has an arbitration clause in its standard agreement cov-
ering the named plaintiff's account, then presumably a substantial percentage of the broker-
dealer's other customers with similar accounts signed the standard agreement with the same
arbitration clause.
271. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202. In the Third Circuit's words, "[i]t would appear therefore
that determining statutory claims to be nonarbitrable on the basis of some judicially recog-
nized public policy rather than as a matter of statutory interpretation is no longer permissi-
ble." Id.
272. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202. The structure of the RICO statute is unique (except for
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son court considered itself bound by Third Circuit precedent to hold that
section 10(b) claims were themselves not arbitrable. It also held that
insofar as a RICO claim was based on a non-arbitrable section 10(b)
claim, the RICO claim was also non-arbitrable. The Third Circuit rea-
soned as follows:
There is no evidence that Congress intended that the availabil-
ity of RICO remedies for section 10(b) should suspend the op-
eration of the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Because the heart of the dispute still will be over
whether the securities laws were violated, RICO plaintiffs rely-
ing on section 10(b) violations are, by virtue of section 29(a) of
the 1934 Act, entitled to a judicial resolution of their RICO
claims.
273
The Third Circuit's assumption is flawed in two respects. First, it
assumes that in all RICO disputes involving section 10(b) claims, the
"heart of the dispute" will be whether section 10(b) was violated. It is at
least equally likely that the "heart" will be whether there was an "enter-
prise" distinct from the defendant "person" alleged to have controlled it,
or whether a series of section 10(b) violations constituted a "pattern."
Second, it assumes that a single RICO count can be split into its predi-
cate acts. As Judge Adams stated in his separate opinion in Jacobson
(and as the Fifth Circuit stated in its criticism of Jacobson),2 74 the RICO
claim is logically distinct from its predicate offenses.27 5 A RICO claim
may consist of mixed violations-some under section 10(b)276 and some
under the federal mail-fraud or wire-fraud statutes, for example.27 7 If the
violations are indeed all facets of a single RICO "pattern," then how can
the one claim for relief be subdivided? In a marginal case, it may be that
segregation of the section 10(b) claims will be enough to preclude estab-
lishment of a pattern.
A further difficulty with the Third Circuit's position is its attenua-
tion of the Arbitration Act. Even assuming that section 10(b) claims are
not arbitrable under predispute agreements because of the antiwaiver
provision, this does not prove the Third Circuit's case. The Arbitration
state statutes imitative of the federal law). It is aimed at racketeering activity defined in terms
of other (predicate) federal and state statutes. Id. The "predicate statutes" are listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
273. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203.
274. Mayaja, 803 F.2d at 163 n.6.
275. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1209 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. The § 10(b) violation, when considered as a criminal offense, is not arbitrable.
277. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 (1982). Indeed, exactly this type of splitting was ordered in
Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203.
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Act requires arbitration except where there is evidence of a contrary leg-
islative intent. Even if there is a contrary legislative intent for the section
10(b) claim, the fact that the Third Circuit found "no evidence" of con-
gressional intent as to RICO arbitrability simply means that there is not
enough evidence to overcome the Arbitration Act's presumption of
arbitrability.
In the end, the Fifth Circuit has the better argument. In the securi-
ties context there is no significant public policy interest in precluding
arbitration of RICO claims. Moreover, to the extent that there is such a
policy interest, it is already well served by the SEC's regulatory oversight
of securities arbitration rules. Although the SEC is not charged with
enforcing RICO, the SEC's interest in ensuring fair procedures for
resolving disputes under the 1933 and 1934 Acts will also effectuate the
policies of RICO.278 Perhaps in some other field more compelling argu-
ments could be mustered, but the policy argument simply does not exist
for securities claims.
VIII. WILKo REVISITED
Having come this far in the examination, there is one last question
that one might ask: will Wilko v. Swan 279 remain good law after McMa-
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.?2 ° This issue is not presented
to the Court in McMahon,28 nor indeed in any of the other cases now
pending before the Court.282 Therefore, the Court cannot directly ad-
278. The SEC's regulatory role will also ensure that the arbitrators are reasonably in-
dependent. Thus the RICO analog of businessmen deciding antitrust cases-Al Capone's de-
ciding RICO claims-is a preposterous scenario. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27,
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986):
[I]t is highly unlikely that the enforceability of arbitration agreements will ever arise
in the types of cases that RICO was meant to address. A "contract" between "a
shopkeeper [who] is approached by an organized crime henchman for protection
money.., undoubtedly would not contain an agreement to arbitrate." There is thus
no reason to hold that the public policy underlying RICO prevents civil RICO claims
from being arbitrated.
Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
279. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
280. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
281. Although McMahon does not directly present the question, both the petitioner and the
SEC have requested (or strongly suggested) that Wilko be overruled. Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 178, at 37 n.22; SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 147, at 20; see also High Court
Hears Argument Regarding Arbitrability of RICO, '34 Act Claims, 19 SEC REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) at 320, 321-22 (Mar. 6, 1987) (petitioner asking Court to overrule Wilko; Solicitor
General's position unclear as to arbitration not under SEC oversight).
282. None of the appellate courts addressed the issue, and none of the certiorari petitions
raise the question. See supra note 14.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: If the Supreme Court enforces the arbitration agreement in McMa-
hon as to the 1934 Act claim, the arbitrability of § 12(2) claims may become an issue on
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dress the question of 1933 Act claims.283 The Court can, however, deter-
mine that the various possible distinctions between the 1933 Act and
1934 Act (e.g., jurisdiction and burden of proof) and between express
and implied rights of action are insignificant and that it must base its
decision on other grounds. If these distinctions are not persuasive, then
in order to enforce predispute arbitration agreements as to section 10(b)
claims, the Court must overrule Wilko.
Thus, if the Court decides to reverse the Second Circuit in McMa-
hon, it can do so in either of at least two ways, and much will depend on
the rationale that the Court employs to explain its decision. The Court
might rest its decision exclusively on the grounds urged by Shearson/
American Express, Inc. (Shearson), the petitioning broker-dealer. More
probably, however, it will rely instead on the grounds urged by the SEC.
Shearson's argument is very much in the mode of Wilko. It restates
the general principle that the Arbitration Act requires enforcement of
arbitiration agreements, absent a contrary congressional intent evidenced
in another statute,284 and then argues that Congress has evinced no such
intent with respect to section 10(b) claims. First, Shearson argues, the
mere existence of a private right of action under section 10(b) does not
provide an exception to the Arbitration Act.285 Second, the "special
right" and procedural advantages analysis of Wilko does not preclude
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate section 10(b) claims.286 Finally,
Shearson argues that under contemporary arbitration procedure, securi-
ties customers receive more than adequate protection of their rights.287
The SEC's argument takes a substantially different approach.
Rather than addressing the question immediately before the Court-the
arbitrability of section 10(b) claims-the SEC focuses on the 1975
amendment to section 19 of the 1934 Act.2"8 Under the amended section
19, the SEC has authority to amend the exchanges' arbitration rules to
ensure that customers' rights are fully protected. Whether or not Wilko's
assumptions concerning the adequacy of arbitration were valid in
1953,289 they most certainly are invalid in 1987. The SEC has specifi-
remand in the Phillips case, where Mr. Lindsay will continue to represent the broker-dealer.
See supra note 14.]
283. Of course, the Court might include a significant footnote, or Justice White might write
another powerful concurrence.
284. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 178, at 10-14.
285. Id. at 15-16.
286. Id. at 19-33.
287. Id. at 33-39.
288. SEC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 147, at 13-21.
289. See id. at 9-12.
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cally approved existing arbitration procedures,29° and to the extent that it
later perceives any previously neglected abridgement of customers'
rights, the SEC can redress the inadequacy through its amendment pow-
ers. In addition to this positive argument, the SEC argues that the Court
should discard distinctions between implied and express rights of action,
and indeed, between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 91
Obviously, Shearson's and the SEC's arguments overlap in many re-
spects, and they intersect at the point of the adequacy and effectiveness of
contemporary arbitration procedures. The SEC's approach, however,
promises to hasten the demise of the Wilko doctrine in all contexts.
Given the SEC's post-1975 powers, this approach makes the most sense.
To the extent that the "private attorneys general" concept applies to se-
curities disputes, the SEC's approach facilitates this quasi-private polic-
ing but does so through the less costly means of arbitration. The
Supreme Court should encourage this development through the careful
choice of its rationale in McMahon.
IX. CONCLUSION
Arbitration and the enforceability of arbitration agreements are
greatly favored by a public policy statutorily declared and judicially em-
braced. The Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan 292 resolved
what the Court itself recognized was a difficult question, and the under-
pinnings of Wilko have now been so completely undermined that the
doctrine should be jettisoned. The question of enforceability of predis-
pute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the 1934 Act, though
290. The only three procedures the SEC states it has approved are those of the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, plus the Uniform Code of Arbitration. Id. at 17-18 & n.13. The SEC might oppose
enforcement of any agreement to arbitrate under rules over which it had no oversight author-
ity, but not necessarily. If the rules were equivalent in their procedural safeguards to rules
over which the SEC has oversight authority, the SEC might not object.
291. The SEC also addresses the one issue that might most trouble the Court in effectively
overruling Wilko: the impact of the legislative history of the 1975 amendments. The confer-
ence committee report had included the remark that "[ilt was the clear understanding of the
conferees that this amendment [to § 28 of the 1934 Act] did not change existing law, as articu-
lated in Wilko ... concerning the effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements
entered into" between public customers and broker-dealers. The remark itself is quite ambigu-
ous, and it cannot be taken to indicate congressional approval of the Wilko doctrine. See supra
notes 170-93 and accompanying text. The most that can be said of this remark is that it
indicates Congress' disavowal of any intent to overrule Wilko through the amendment to
§ 28(b). It says nothing of the impact of the amendment to § 19, particularly as those amend-
ments have been expansively interpreted by the SEC. By leaving the question open, Congress
has left room for courts to find the true significance of the SEC's new powers.
292. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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not an easy question, is less difficult than that raised in Wilko. Neither
the factors determinative in Wilko nor considerations arising outside of
Wilko compel a conclusion that the 1934 Act was intended to effect a
partial repeal of the Arbitration Act. The question is less difficult still for
securities claims asserted under RICO, for that statute contains no an-
tiwaiver provision; any exception to the Arbitration Act must be based
on judicially created policy grounds, which recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have consistently rejected. The Arbitration Act should be imple-
mented in full to require enforcement of predispute agreements to
arbitrate controversies in the securities context.
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APPENDIX
17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1 to 180.5 (1986):
§ 180.1 Definitions.
(a) The term "claim or grievance" as used in this part shall mean
any dispute which arises out of any transaction on or subject to the rules
of a contract market,. executed by or effected through a member of that
contract market or employee thereof which dispute does not require for
adjudication the presence of esssential witnesses or third parties over
whom the contract market does not have jurisdiction and who are not
otherwise available. The term claim or grievance does not include dis-
putes arising from cash market transactions which are not a part of or
directly connected with any transaction for the purchase or sale of any
commodity for future delivery or commodity option.
(b) The term "customer" as used in this part includes an option
customer (as defined in § 1.3(j) of this chapter) and any person for or on
behalf of whom a member of a contract market effects a transaction on
such contract market, except another member of that contract market.
§ 180.2 Fair and equitable procedure.
Every contract market shall adopt rules which provide for a fair and
equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settlement
of customer's claims and grievances against any member or employee
thereof which shall include at least the following as minimum require-
ments for a fair and equitable procedure:
(a) The procedure shall be objective and impartial. Customers
must be provided with the choice of a panel or other decision-maker
composed of one or more persons, of which at least a majority are not
members or associated with any member of a contract market, or em-
ployee thereof, and are not otherwise associated with a contract market.
The rules of a contract market may, with proper notice, require the cus-
tomer to request such a panel or other such decision-maker at the time of
submission of the claim or grievance to the procedure. Exparte contacts
by any of the parties with members of any panel or other decision-maker
shall not be permitted.
(b) The procedure shall grant each of the parties the right, if de-
sired, to be represented by counsel, at his own expense, in any aspect of
the procedure.
(c) The procedure shall provide for the prompt settlement of
claims or grievances and counterclaims, if any (permitted by § 180.4 of
this part). Unnecessary or unreasonable delay by any of the parties shall
not be permitted.
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(d) The procedure shall require adequate notice to the parties and
opportunity for a prompt hearing as follows:
(1) Each of the parties shall be entitled personally to appear at
such hearing, unless the contract market shall have adopted a procedure
for the written submission of claims or grievances (and any counter-
claims applicable thereto) which are in the aggregate under $2,500. If
the claim or grievance (and any counterclaim applicable thereto) is in the
aggregate under $2,500, then provision may be made for the claim or
grievance of a customer to be resolved without a hearing through a sub-
mission on the basis of written documents.
(2) The formal rules of evidence need not apply at the hearing.
Nevertheless, the procedures established may not be so informal as to
deny due process. Each party must be given adequate opportunity to
prepare and present all relevant facts in support of the claims and griev-
ances, defenses or counterclaims (permitted by § 180.4 of this part), and
to present rebuttal evidence to such claims or grievances, defenses or
counterclaims made by the other parties.
(3) Each party shall be entitled to examine other parties and any
witnesses appearing at the hearing and to examine all relevant documents
presented in connection with the claim or grievance, defense or counter-
claim applicable thereto.
(4) A verbatim record of the hearing may be required, the cost of
which must be reasonable. There shall be no requirement that a verba-
tim record be transcribed unless requested by a party who shall bear the
cost of the transcription, and contract markets shall otherwise seek to
minimize the cost associated with such record.
(e) The procedure shall provide adequate notice to the parties in
advance of a submission of a claim or grievance, or counterclaim (permit-
ted by § 180.4 of this part), of the nature and amount of any fees or costs
which may be assessed against customers utilizing the procedure. Fees
or costs shall be reasonable, particularly in relation to the complexity and
amount of the claim or grievance or counterclaim, if any, presented.
Costs may be apportioned among the parties or may be assessed against
the losing party as the panel or other decision-maker, in its discretion,
sees fit. The rules of a contract market, however, must provide that a
contract market member which is a party to an arbitration proceeding
shall pay any incremental fees which may be assessed by a qualified fo-
rum for provision of a panel or other decision-maker which conforms to
the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection, unless the arbitra-
tors in a particular proceeding determine that the customer has acted in
bad faith in initiating or conducting that proceeding.
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(f) The procedure shall provide that the settlement award shall be
rendered promptly in writing and be final. There shall be no right of
appeal to any entity within the contract market which can overturn the
settlement-procedure decision; the only right of appeal being as provided
under applicable law.
(g) The procedure shall not impose any restrictions on the jurisdic-
tion or venue of any court to enforce an award so rendered.
§ 180.3 Voluntary procedure and compulsory payments.
(a) The use by customers of the dispute settlement procedures es-
tablished by contract markets pursuant to the Act or this part or of the
arbitration or other dispute settlement procedures specified in an agree-
ment under paragraph (b)(3) of this section shall be voluntary. The pro-
cedures so established shall prohibit any agreement or understanding
pursuant to which customers of members of the contract market agree to
submit claims or grievances for settlement under said procedures prior to
the time when the claim or grievance arose, except in accordance with
paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) No futures commission merchant, introducing broker, floor
broker, commodity pool operator, commodity trading advisor, or associ-
ated person shall enter into any agreement or understanding with a cus-
tomer in which the customer agrees, prior to the time the claim or
grievance arises, to submit such claim or grievance to any settlement pro-
cedure except as follows:
(1) Signing the agreement must not be made a condition for the
customer to utilize the services offered by the futures commission
merchant, introducing broker, floor broker, commodity pool operator,
commodity trading advisor or associated person.
(2) If the agreement is contained as a clause or clauses of a broader
agreement, the customer must separately endorse the clause or clauses
containing the cautionary language and other provisions specified in this
section;
(3) The agreement may not require the customer to waive the right
to seek reparations under section 14 of the Act and Part 12 of these regu-
lations. Accordingly, the customer must be advised in writing that he or
she may seek reparations under section 14 of the Act by an election made
within 45 days after the futures commission merchant, introducing bro-
ker, floor broker, commodity pool operator, commodity trading advisor
or associated person notifies the customer that arbitration will be de-
manded under the agreement. This notice must be given at the time
when such person notifies the customer of an intention to arbitrate. The
customer must also be advised that if he or she seeks reparations under
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section 14 of the Act and the Commission declines to institute reparation
proceedings, the claim or grievance will be subject to the preexisting arbi-
tration agreement and must also be advised that aspects of the claims or
grievances that are not subject to the reparations procedure (i.e. do not
constitute a violation of the Act or rules thereunder) may be required to
be submitted to the arbitration or other dispute settlement procedure set
forth in the preexisting arbitration agreement.
(4) The agreement must advise the customer that, at such time as
he or she may notify the futures commission merchant, introducing bro-
ker, floor broker, commodity pool operator, commodity trading advisor
or associated person that he or she intends to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion, or at such time as such person notifies the customer of its intent to
submit a claim to arbitration, the customer will have the opportunity to
elect a qualified forum for conducting the proceeding. Within ten busi-
ness days after receipt of such notice from the customer, or at the time
the futures commission merchant, introducing broker, floor broker, com-
modity pool operator, commodity trading advisor or associated person so
notifies the customer, the futures commission merchant, introducing bro-
ker, floor broker, commodity pool operator, commodity trading advisor
or associated person must provide the customer with a list of two or
more organizations whose procedures qualify them to conduct arbitra-
tions in accordance with the requirements of § 180.2 of this part, to-
gether with a copy of the rules of each forum listed. This list must
include: (i) The contract market, if available, upon which the transaction
giving rise to the dispute was executed or could have been executed or a
registered futures association designated by such contract market; and
(ii) At least one other organization which will provide the customer with
the opportunity to select the location of the arbitration proceeding from
among several major cities in diverse geographic regions and which will
provide the customer with the choice of a panel or other decision-maker
composed of a least one or more persons, of which at least a majority are
not members or associated with a member of a contract market or em-
ployee thereof, and which are not otherwise associated with a contract
market (mixed panel). The customer shall, within forty-five days after
receipt of such list, notify the opposing party of the organization se-
lected. A customer's failure to provide such notice shall give the oppos-
ing party the right to select an organization from the list.
(5) The agreement must acknowledge that the futures commission
merchant, introducing broker, floor broker, commodity pool operator,
commodity trading advisor or associated person will pay any incremental
fees which may be assessed by a qualified forum for provision of a mixed
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panel, unless the arbitrators in a particular proceeding determine that the
customer has acted in bad faith in initiating or conducting that
proceeding.
(6) The agreement must include the following language printed in
large boldface type:
THREE FORUMS EXIST FOR THE RESOLUTION OF COM-
MODITY DISPUTES: CIVIL COURT LITIGATION, REPARA-
TIONS AT THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COM-
MISSION (CFTC) AND ARBITRATION CONDUCTED BY A
SELF-REGULATORY OR OTHER PRIVATE ORGANIZATION.
THE CFTC RECOGNIZES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SETTLE DISPUTES BY ARBITRATION MAY IN SOME CASES
PROVIDE MANY BENEFITS TO CUSTOMERS, INCLUDING
THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN AN EXPEDITIOUS AND FINAL RES-
OLUTION OF DISPUTES WITHOUT INCURRING SUBSTAN-
TIAL COSTS. THE CFTC REQUIRES, HOWEVER, THAT EACH
CUSTOMER INDIVIDUALLY EXAMINE THE RELATIVE MER-
ITS OF ARBITRATION AND THAT YOUR CONSENT TO THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BE VOLUNTARY.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU: (1) MAY BE WAIV-
ING YOUR RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW; AND (2) ARE
AGREEING TO BE BOUND BY ARBITRATION OF ANY
CLAIMS OR COUNTERCLAIMS WHICH YOU OR [NAME] MAY
SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT. YOU
ARE NOT, HOWEVER, WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO ELECT IN-
STEAD TO PETITION THE CFTC TO INSTITUTE REPARA-
TIONS PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE COM-
MODITY EXCHANGE ACT WITH RESPECT TO ANY DISPUTE
WHICH MAY BE ARBITRATED PURSUANT TO THIS AGREE-
MENT. IN THE EVENT A DISPUTE ARISES, YOU WILL BE NO-
TIFIED IF [NAME] INTENDS TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO
ARBITRATION. IF YOU BELIEVE A VIOLATION OF THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT IS INVOLVED AND IF YOU
PREFER TO REQUEST A SECTION 14 "REPARATIONS" PRO-
CEEDING BEFORE THE CFTC, YOU WILL HAVE 45 DAYS
FROM THE DATE OF SUCH NOTICE IN WHICH TO MAKE
THAT ELECTION.
YOU NEED NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT TO OPEN AN
ACCOUNT WITH [NAME]. SEE 17 C.F.R. 180.1-180.5.
Customer
(7) If the agreement specifies a forum for arbitration other than a
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contract market or registered futures association, the procedures of such
forum must be fair and equitable as defined by § 180.2 of this part.
(c) The procedure established by a contract market pursuant to
section 5a(11) of the Act or this part may require parties utilizing such
procedure to agree, under applicable state law, submission agreement or
otherwise, to be bound by an award rendered in the procedure, provided
that the agreement to submit the claim or grievance to the procedure was
made in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section or that the agree-
ment to submit the claim or grievance was made after the claim or griev-
ance arose. Any award so rendered shall be enforceable in accordance
with applicable law.
(d) The procedure established by a contract market pursuant to
the Act or this part shall not establish any unreasonably short limitation
period foreclosing submission of customers' claim or grievances or coun-
terclaims (permitted by § 180.4 of this part) by contract market members
or employees thereof.
§ 180.4 Counterclaims.
A procedure established by a contract market under the Act for the
settlement of customers' claims or grievances against a member or em-
ployee thereof may permit the submission of a counterclaim in the proce-
dure by a person against whom a claim or grievance is brought. The
contract market may permit such a counterclaim where the counterclaim
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the cus-
tomer's claim or grievance and does not require for adjudication the pres-
ence of essential witnesses, parties or third persons over whom the
contract market does not have jurisdiction. Other counterclaims are per-
missible only if the customer agrees to the submission after the counter-
claim has arisen, and if the aggregate monetary value of the counterclaim
is capable of calculation.
§ 180.5 Member-to-member settlement procedures.
A contract market may establish a procedure for compulsory settle-
ment of claims or grievances or disputes which do not involve customers.
If adopted, the procedure shall be independent of, and shall not interfere
with or delay the resolution of, customers' claims or grievances submit-
ted for resolution under the procedure established pursuant to the Act.
Such a procedure shall provide procedural safeguards which must in-
clude, at a minimum, fair and equitable procedures conforming to those
set forth in § 180.2 of this part, except that the election of the mixed
panel and the prohibition of appeal to any entity within the contract mar-
ket, contained in § 180.2 (a) and (f) of this part, respectively, need not be
required.

